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YEAR IN REVIEW
I. INTRODUCrION
Year in Review contains brief summaries of selected decisions
by the Alaska Supreme Court and the Alaska Court of Appeals.
The primary purpose of this review is to familiarize practitioners
with significant decisions handed down by these courts in 1994.
The summaries focus on the substantive areas of the law addressed,
the statutes or common law principles interpreted, and the essence
of each of the holdings. Space does not permit review of all cases
decided by the courts this year, but the authors have attempted to
highlight decisions signaling a departure from prior law or resolving
issues of first impression. The appendix lists the cases that were
omitted from this year's review. Generally, these cases were
omitted because they applied well-settled principles of law or
involved narrow holdings of limited import. Attorneys are advised
not to rely upon the information contained in this note without
further reference to the cases cited.
The opinions have been grouped according to general subject
matter rather than by the nature of the underlying claims. The
cases have been divided into the following nine areas of law:
administrative, business, constitutional, criminal, employment,
family, procedure, property and tort. In some instances, these
categories have been further subdivided into more specific legal
areas.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The Alaska Supreme Court's decisions during 1994 in the area
of administrative law included a number of significant rulings with
impact on offshore mining, use of the James Dalton Highway and
the budget reserve fund. The cases have been grouped by subject
matter under the headings Disciplinary Proceedings, Native Law,
Land and the Environment and General Proceedings.
A. Disciplinary Proceedings
In re Beconovich' involved an attorney's failure to respond to
a grievance filed against him with the Alaska Bar Association.2
1. 884 P.2d 1080 (Alaska 1994).
2. Id. at 1081.
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Under Alaska Bar Rule 22(a), failure to respond is deemed an
admission of culpability.3 The Alaska Supreme Court held that an
attorney must show excusable neglect and a meritorious defense in
order to be relieved from the operation of Rule 22(a).4 In the
instant action, the court found that the attorney's failure to respond
was not excusable neglect because he admitted that he had no
"adequate explanation" for his failure.' As there was no excus-
able neglect, the issue of whether he had a meritorious defense was
not reached. Thus, the attorney's failure to respond to the
grievance filed against him was deemed an admission.6
In re Burrell considered what constitutes the prohibited
"practice of law" and "representing another" by a lawyer on
suspended status.' While suspended, Burrell, acting in his capacity
as an officer of a corporation, submitted briefs and affidavits to the
Alaska State Commission for Human Rights, appeared on behalf
of the corporation in district court,9 questioned witnesses in small
claims court, and wrote several letters for persons and corporations
on legal stationery.'0 The Alaska Supreme Court held that these
actions constituted the "practice of law" in violation of the
attorney's suspended status."
Burrell argued that denying him the right to represent a
corporation in small claims court violated his equal protection
rights under both the Federal and Alaska Constitutions because
nonlawyers were allowed to appear in small claims courts as
corporate representatives. In rejecting this argument, the Alaska
Supreme Court reasoned that it was necessary to preclude
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1083.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. 882 P.2d 1257 (Alaska 1994).
8. Id. at 1261.
9. A corporation is prohibited from appearing in district court without an
attorney in all cases other than a small claim. ALASKA STAT. § 22.20.040(a)
(Supp. 1994). Burrell alone appeared in district court for the corporation, which
prompted the trial judge to state, "'I think that you are just flagrantly violating
the ban on your practicing law."' Burrell, 882 P.2d at 1260.
10. Burrell, 882 P.2d at 1259-60. Burrell did cross out the words "Law offices
of' on the stationery, which left untouched only Burrell's name. Id. However, the
court found that the words "Law Offices of" remained readable. Id.
11. Id at 1258-1261.
12. Id. at 1262.
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suspended attorneys from representing corporations in court, in
their capacity as corporate officers, in order to "prevent circumven-
tion of the prohibition against the practice of law by suspended
attorneys."13  The court also rejected Burrell's claim that the
terms "representing another" and "practice of law" in Bar Rule 15
were unconstitutionally vague.'4
B. Native Law
Capener v. Tanadgusix Corp.' involved the interpretation of
two provisions of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
(ANCSA). These provisions abolished the title claims of the
Native people of Alaska in exchange for 962.5 million dollars and
44 million acres of public land. 6 The Act established regional and
village corporations for the purpose of receiving this money and
land.'7 Section 14(c)(1) of the Act requires village corporations
to reconvey land "to any Native or non-Native occupant" who
occupied the land for any of the following purposes: as a primary
residence, a primary place of business, a subsistence campsite or a
headquarters for reindeer husbandry. 8 Section 14(c)(2) requires
village corporations to reconvey to "the occupant" land occupied
by a nonprofit organization as of December 18, 1971."9 The issue
in this case was the meaning of the term "occupant" as used in
these provisions of the Act?'
In 1966, Capener, a missionary with the Assemblies of God
Church, built a church, house and garage on federal land.2'
Capener occupied the land under a special use permit Howev-
er, the permit was granted to the "Assemblies of God Home
Missions Department," not to Capener3
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. 884 P.2d 1060 (Alaska 1994).
16. Id at 1061.
17. IL
18. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, § 14(c)(1), 43 U.S.C.A. § 1613(c)(1)
(West 1986).
19. Id. § 1613(c)(2).
20. Capener, 884 P.2d at 1062.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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In 1974, the Village Corporation of St. Paul, Tanadgusix
Corporation (TDX), was issued a patent to property which included
the land occupied by Capener.24 TDX notified Capener that it
was cancelling the special use permit unless new lease arrangements
could be agreed upon.' Capener refused to agree to a lease with
TDX, asserting, under section 14(c) of ANSCA, that title should be
quieted in her favor.2 Summary judgment was granted in favor
of TDX.
The parties' arguments raised three questions for resolution:
(1) whether a permittee may be an "occupant" entitled to convey-
ance of title; (2) whether an occupier of property subject to a
revocable permit issued to another may be an "occupant" entitled
to conveyance of title; and (3) whether the right to a conveyance
of title can be transferred subsequent to the legal occupancy date
set forth in sections 14(c)(1) and (2).'
The Alaska Supreme Court first interpreted "occupant" as
"one who occupies a particular place or premise and has an
equitable interest in the improvements thereon., 29  Under this
interpretation, the court held that a permittee may be an "occu-
pant" within section 14(c).30 The court also answered the second
question in the affirmative, holding that an occupier of property
subject to a revocable permit issued to another may be an "occu-
pant." Therefore, an occupier may be entitled to a conveyance
under section 14(c) if she has an equitable ownership interest in the
improvements made to the property prior to the legal occupancy
date.3' Finally, in response to the third question, the court held
that an occupant's right to reconveyance may be transferred to a
third party after the legal occupancy date.32 The court reversed
the grant of summary judgment becuase genuine issues of material
fact existed as to each of these questions and remanded the case
for their resolution.3
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1063.
28. Id. at 1064.
29. Id. at 1073.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1074.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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C. Land and the Environment
In Kuitsarak Corp. v. Swope,' the Alaska Supreme Court
ruled that the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) incorrectly
granted certain Offshore Prospecting Permits (OPPs).35 First, the
court held that, before granting an OPP, the DNR must take a
"hard look" at the potential impact of mining, including the effects
on "heavy metal concentrations, fish migration patterns, [and]
background water quality., 36 The court required such an inquiry
because a non-competitive mining lease must be granted by DNR
if a "workable mineral deposit" is found on an OPP site.37
The court also ruled that the assistance of an "interested"
contractor in preparation of the resource assessment report does
not per se create an impermissible conflict of interest." However,
the court concluded that DNR's failure to take "meaningful
responsibility" for the underlying information rendered the report
inadequate.39 The court rejected the state's argument that, since
DNR had retained its discretion to deny the OPP, there was no
conflict of interest.' The court found this argument unpersuasive,
because if the report suffers from bias, the DNR will be unable to
make a fully informed decision.4'
Alaska Federation for Community Self-Reliance v. Alaska
Public Utilities Commission42 (APUC) arose from the plan to
construct the Healy Clean Coal Project (HCCP). APUC approved
the project after determining that HCCP would provide "'services
[that] are required for the convenience and necessity of the public"'
and that "'the applicant is fit, willing and able to provide utility
services."' 43
The Federation challenged APUC's issuance of the certificate
on two grounds: (1) APUC impermissibly excluded from its
decision-making process the public costs of environmental impacts
34. 870 P.2d 387 (Alaska 1994).
35. Id. at 398.
36. Id. at 395-96.
37. Id. at 394 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.250(b) (1989); ALASKA ADMIN.
CODE tit. 11, § 86.530 (Oct. 1988)).
38. Id. at 398.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. 879 P.2d 1015 (Alaska 1994).
43. Id. at 1019 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 42.05.241 (1989)).
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and public subsidies stemming from HCCP, and (2) the failure of
two of the five APUC commissioners to participate in the final
vote.44
First, the Alaska Supreme Court found that the impact on
utility rates is the focus of the factors to be considered by APUC
in determining whether the proposed utility service is necessary.45
Thus, APUC need not consider costs that do not impact rates and
that are unrelated to the fitness and ability of the applicant to
provide the service.' Furthermore, the commission need only
find that "there is a substantial need for the service" in order to
conclude that HCCP is necessary.4 7
Next, the court considered the Federation's claim that the
failure of two of the five APUC commissioners to vote on the final
decision invalidated the certificate.4s The court noted that three
members of the APUC constitute a quorum,49 and that under the
well-established rule of common law, a quorum may act for the
entire body.0
D. General Proceedings
In Turpin v. North Slope Borough,5 the Alaska Supreme
Court reviewed the issuance of an injunction staying the Depart-
ment of Transportation's (DOT) decision to open the northern part
of the James Dalton Highway to unrestricted public use.52 The
DOT adopted regulations in 1978 closing the northern stretch of
the highway, from Dietrich Camp to Prudhoe Bay, to all vehicles
not bearing a special permit.53 However, in 1991 the DOT gave
notice that it had decided to open the northern portion to the
public by repealing Alaska Administrative Code title 17, section
44. Id. at 1016.
45. Id. at 1020.
46. Id.
47. Id. Justice Rabinowitz in dissent, joined by Justice Bryner (sitting pro
tern.), argued that APUC "is required to consider all factors bearing on the
convenience and necessity of the public, including environmental costs or impacts."
Id at 1023 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1021 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 42.05.071 (1989)).
50. Id. at 1022 (citations omitted).
51. 879 P.2d 1009 (Alaska 1994).
52. Id. at 1011.
53. Id. at 1010-11 (citing ALASKA ADMiN. CODE tit. 17, § 30.010 (Oct. 1988)).
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30 .' The superior court issued an injunction upon finding that
the DOT's opening of the Highway would violate Alaska Statutes
section 19.40.100.55
The Alaska Supreme Court first addressed the superior court's
ruling that Alaska Statutes section 19.40.100 restricts the DOT from
opening the Highway to the public. 6 The DOT argued that
section 19.40.100 only sets minimum requirements that DOT must
meet.' The court found this argument persuasive because it was
supported by the original right-of-way grant from the federal
government, which specified that the road should be public.
58
However, the court held that the DOT's action violated Alaska
Statutes section 44.62.195V' Section 44.62.195 requires an agency
amending regulations to estimate any possible increase in appropri-
ations for at least three fiscal years following the change.' The
DOT asserted that it would not require any additional money to
open and maintain the Highway, but the court pointed out that
other agencies would be affected by the DOT's action, such as the
Department of Public Safety and the Department of Fish &
Game.6' As such, the court concluded that the injunction was
appropriate until the DOT gave notice of potential increases in
appropriations and received public comment on its proposal. 2
In State v. Palmer,' the Alaska Supreme Court addressed the
issue of severability in the context of an emergency regulation
adopted by the Board of Game to protect the Nelchina caribou
54. Id. at 1011.
55. Id. at 1011 n.4. Section 19.40.100 reads as follows:
(a) The department shall maintain the highway and keep it open to
industrial or commercial traffic throughout the year.
(b) "industrial or commercial traffic" means
1) travel necessary and related to resource exploration and development
or to support of those activities, if the individual engaged in those
activities has all necessary permits;
(2) travel necessary and related to access by local residents to their
property, or;
(3) motor carriers engaged in commerce.
ALAsKA STAT. § 19.40.100 (1988).
56. Turpin, 879 P.2d at 1012.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1013.
60. ALAsKA STAT. § 44.62.195 (1993).
61. Turpin, 879 P.2d at 1013.
62. Id. at 1014.
63. 882 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1994).
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herd, Alaska Administrative Code title 5, section 85.025(a)(8). 4
The regulation contains three parts: (1) a participatory component,
defining who may hunt, which favors subsistence users;' (2) a
seasonal component, setting the length of the hunting season; and
(3) a bag limit component, establishing a bag limit of one caribou
per hunter.6
Palmer, who was not a subsistence user, shot two caribou and
was charged with violating the bag limit.67 Palmer filed a motion
to dismiss the charges based on his assertion that the participatory
component of the regulation was invalid." The court of appeals
granted Palmer's motion, finding that the state had conceded the
issue of validity.69 The state petitioned for hearing on the issue of
whether the regulation might be saved by severing the invalid
participatory component. 0
The Alaska Supreme Court applied the test established in
Lynden Transportation, Inc. v. State?' to examine the severability
question.7' First, the court found that the regulation could stand
on its own absent the participatory component.73 The court then
considered whether the Board of Game would have wished to have
the remaining valid portions of the regulation enforced.74 The
court found that the Board's motivation in adopting the emergency
regulation rested upon the desire to stage a hunt for subsistence
users, while realizing that other hunters could not be completely
64. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 85.025(a)(8) (Oct. 1994).
65. Id. at 388; see ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.258 (1992)(establishing various
preferences in favor of subsistence users in the allocation of fish and game
resources); McDowell v. State, 785 P.2d 1, 10-12 (Alaska 1989)(casting doubt on
the validity of many statutory provisions that favor subsistence users in light of
several clauses in the Alaska Constitution).
66. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 85.025(a)(8) (Oct. 1994).
67. Palmer; 882 P.2d at 386.
68. Id. at 387.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. 532 P.2d 700,713 (Alaska 1975)(holding that a provision is severable only
where the court concludes that absent the provision at issue, legal effect can be
given to the remaining law, and that the body which enacted the law would have
intended the provision to stand in the event that the provision in question was
severed).
72. Palmer; 882 P.2d at 388.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 389.
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excluded The court determined that this goal would be met by
the regulation's remaining components, and thus held the invalid
participatory portion severable.76
Hickel v. Halford" involved the interpretation of the term
"administrative proceeding" found in article IX, section 17(a) of
the Alaska Constitution, 8 which establishes the budget reserve
fund.79 The instant action arose from a suit brought by state
legislators against then-Governor Hickel and the Department of
Revenue (DOR), challenging the deposit into the general fund,
rather than into the budget reserve fund, of funds received from a
corporate taxpayerw The taxpayer had challenged its tax assess-
ment by filing a request for appeal but had not yet filed a request
for a formal adjudicatory hearing." The DOR asserted that an
administrative proceeding under Section 17(a) is not initiated until
a request is made for a formal hearing." Therefore, the collected
funds were properly put into the general fund."
The Alaska Supreme Court had previously set forth three
criteria defining an administrative proceeding: (1) a dispute must
exist; (2) a document reflecting the fact of the dispute must be
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 872 P.2d 171 (Alaska 1994).
78. Article IX, section 17(a) reads in relevant part:
(a) There is established as a separate fund in the State treasury the
budget reserve fund. Except for money deposited into the permanent
fund under Section 15 of this article, all money received by the State
after July 1, 1990, as a result of the termination, through settlement or
otherwise, of an administrative proceeding or of litigation in a State or
federal court involving mineral lease bonuses, rentals, royalties, royalty
sale proceeds, federal mineral revenue sharing payments or bonuses, or
involving taxes imposed on mineral income, production, or property, shall
be deposited in the budget reserve fund.
ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 17(a) (emphasis added).
79. Hickel, 872 P.2d at 172-73.
80. Id. at 174.
81. Id. Where a taxpayer files an appeal of its assessment with the DOR, the
taxpayer may request either an "informal conference" or a "formal hearing"
pursuant to Alaska Statutes section 43.05.240(a) and (b). ALASKA STAT. §
43.05.240(a), (b) (1990). Where the taxpayer requests an informal conference but
is dissatisfied with the decision rendered therein, the taxpayer may, within a
specified period of time, request a formal hearing. Id. § 43.05.240(b)(2). Appeal
from the decision rendered after a formal hearing is to superior court. Id.
§ 43.05.240(d).
82. Hickel, 872 P.2d at 174.
83. Id.
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served by one party on the other party; and 3) this document must
set in motion mechanisms under which the dispute will ultimately
be resolved.'
Turning to the issue of whether an assessment of tax collec-
tione delineates the start of an administrative proceeding, the
court proceeded to apply this test.' First, the court concluded
that at the time the state issues an assessment, a dispute does
exist," as the assessment asserts that the DOR believes that the
taxpayer has not met his tax obligations." Second, the court
determined that an assessment provides written notice that
particular relief is sought as the assessment letter lists a total
amount due and demands payment.89 Third, the court found that
Alaska law provides that an assessment will lead to the resolution
of the dispute regardless of the other party's response, and thus
meets the final requirement for an administrative proceeding. 0
Concluding that DOR's assesment satifisfied all three elements,91
the court gave its ruling retroactive application, therfore requiring
the state to restore the wrongfully allocated funds to the budget
reserve fund.'
In the related case of Hickel v. Cowper,93 the Alaska Supreme
Court was asked to interpret the following terms found in article
IX, section 17(b) of the Alaska Constitution,94 and defined in
84. Id. at 176.
$5. Alaska Statutes section 43.05.270(a) addresses the collection of tax after
an assessment and reads in part: "When the assessment of a tax imposed by this
title has been made. . ., the tax may be collected by levy or by a proceeding in
court.. ." ALAsKA STAT. § 43.05.270(a) (1990).
86. Hicke4 872 P.2d at 181.
87. ML
88. Id. at 182.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id at 183.
92. Id at 185.
93. 874 P.2d 922 (Alaska 1994).
94. Article IX, section 17(b) reads as follows:
If the amount available for appropriation for a fiscal year is less than the
amount appropriated for the previous fiscal year, an appropriation may
be made from the budget reserve fund. However, the amount appropri-
ated from the fund under this subsection may not exceed the amount
necessary, when added to other funds available for appropriation, to
provide for total appropriations equal to the amount of appropriations
made in the previous calendar year for the previous fiscal year.
ALAsKA CoNsT. art. IX, § 17(b).
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Alaska Statutes section 37.10.420(a)(1), (2), and (3) respectively:9'
(1) "amount available for appropriation"; (2) "amount appropriat-
ed for the previous fiscal year"; and (3) "amount of appropriations
made in the previous calendar year for the previous fiscal year."96
The court found the statutory definitions to be unacceptable and
held that Alaska Statutes sections 37.10.420(a)(1), (2), and (3) were
unconstitutional.'
Regarding the phrase, "amount available for appropriation,"
defined in subsection (a)(1), the Alaska Supreme Court ruled that
the statute's definition was too narrow." On the other hand, the
court also rejected former Governor Cowper's proposal that all
funds which a simple majority of the legislature can make available
be considered the "amount available for appropriation."'  The
court concluded that Cowper's broad definition of availability
would require the "complete restructuring of the established
financial system of the state government."'' 1
95. Section 37.10.420(a) reads in relevant part:
(1) "the amount available for appropriation" or "funds available for
appropriation" means
(A) the unrestricted revenue accruing to the general fund during the
fiscal year;
(B) general fund program receipts as defined in AS 37.05.146;
(C) the unreserved, undesignated general fund balance carried forward
from the preceding fiscal year that is not subject to the repayment
obligation imposed by art. IX, sec. 17(d); and
(D) the balance in the statutory budget reserve fund established in AS
37.05.540;
(2) "the amount appropriated for the previous fiscal year" means the
amount appropriated from the
(A) constitutional budget reserve fund under the authority granted in
art. IX, sec. 17, Constitution of the State of Alaska; and
(B) same revenue sources used to calculate the money available for
appropriation for the current fiscal year, and
(3) "the amount of appropriations made in the previous calendar year
for the previous fiscal year" means appropriations made from sources
identified in (2) of this subsection for a fiscal year that were enacted
during the calendar year that ends on December 31 of that same fiscal
year.
ALASKA STAT. § 37.10.420(a) (Supp. 1994).
96. Hicke4 874 P.2d at 923.
97. Id. at 935-36. The court also held unconstitutional Alaska Statutes section
37.10.420(b), which detailed the means under which appropriations from the
budget reserve fund are to be repaid. Id at 936.
98. Id at 927.
99. Id.
100. Id
1995]
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The court held that the "amount available for appropriation"
includes "all monies over which the legislature has retained the
power to appropriate" and which are not available to pay expendi-
tures without further legislative appropriation, and the amounts
which the legislature actually appropriated for the fiscal year
"whether or not they would have been considered available prior
to appropriation."' 0' Consequently, the court determined that the
legislature's definition failed to include several funds, including
trust receipts, restricted accounts within the general fund which
require further legislative appropriation before they can be
expended, and the permanent fund earnings reserve account, in
their definition of the "amount available for appropriation" which
in fact are available within the meaning of section 17(b)."°
The court next held that the phrase "amount appropriated for
the previous fiscal year" includes all money set aside by the
legislature for the previous fiscal year that went for specific
purposes. 03 The set-aside must have been reasonably definite,
requiring no further legislative action." 4
Lastly, the court defined "amount of appropriations made in
the previous calendar year for the previous fiscal year" simply as
the "amount of all appropriations made in the calendar year in
which the previous fiscal year began."' 5
III. BusINEsS LAW
The Alaska Supreme Court's 1994 docket of business law cases
covered a wide spectrum of issues. The court analyzed cases
involving the permissible scope of covenants not-to-compete and
the tort of intentional interference with a contract. Also, in the
realm of insurance law, the court interpreted civil authority and like
kind and quality clauses. The business law cases have been
grouped into the subjects of corporate law, contract law, commer-
cial law and insurance law.
101. Id. at 935.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
152 [Vol. 12:1
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A. Corporate Law
Willner's Fuel Distributors, Inc. v. Noreen'0 6 addressed the
issue of whether corporate counsel of a dissolved, insolvent
corporation has a fiduciary duty to that corporation's creditors.
Noreen served both as corporate counsel for the dissolved
corporation, Rosson, Inc. which dissolved in 1985, and personal
attorney for Thomas Rosson, the corporation's sole owner."
Wiliner's, a creditor of Rosson, Inc., sought satisfaction of a
default judgment.' 8 Willner's alleged that Noreen violated his
fiduciary duty to Rosson, Inc.'s creditors by failing to transfer funds
in satisfaction of Rosson, Inc.'s debt."°
The Alaska Supreme Court first examined whether Rosson
owed a fiduciary duty to Willner's. Willner's argued that Noreen's
fiduciary duty flowed from that owed by Rosson."0 The court
found that Rosson did owe to Rosson, Inc.'s creditors a fiduciary
duty to preserve the corporation's assets for their benefit. The
court then turned to the issue of Noreen's duty."' The court held
that "if an attorney represents both a dissolved or insolvent
corporation and a director or officer of that firm, and if the
attorney controls corporate assets, then the attorney must protect
the financial fights of creditors to these assets, where he or she
knows or should know that the director or officer intends to
interfere with creditors' claims through an improper distribution of
these assets.""12
B. Contract Law
In Alaska Division of Agriculture v. Carpenter,"' the Alaska
Supreme Court reversed the denial of a directed verdict for the
state on Carpenter's claim that he was excused from repaying his
agricultural loans due to mutual mistake, commercial impracticabili-
ty, and misrepresentation."4  Carpenter bought land from the
106. 882 P.2d 399 (Alaska 1994).
107. Id. at 401.
108. Id. at 402.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 404-05.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 406.
113. 869 P.2d 1181 (Alaska 1994).
114. Id. at 1182.
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state, which he intended to use for farming."5 In the sale con-
tract, the state disclaimed all warranties of suitability for agriculture
and profitability.1 6 Carpenter's subsequent efforts at planting
came to naught, as the ground he had purchased perennially
flooded, making agriculture impossible."7 After several years,
Carpenter abandoned his efforts, the land was reclassified as
"unsuitable for agriculture, and he quit repaying his loans. 118
The state sued for damages, repossession, and foreclosure.1
The Alaska Supreme Court held that the trial court should
have granted the state's motion for a directed verdict on the issue
of mutual mistake. The court found that the warranty disclaimers
in the contract raised the possibility of unsuitability in the parties'
minds."2  Thus, the court determined that as Carpenter had
assumed the risk of unsuitability, he could not discharge his
responsibility on the ground of mutual mistake.121 The court also
observed that repayment was not commercially impracticable
because Carpenter knew that the lands might be unsuitable. As a
result, his duty to repay the loans arose independent of the land's
status.122 Finally, the court rejected Carpenter's argument that
the state had misrepresented the land's suitability for farming. It
concluded that the disclaimers in the contract eviscerated his
contention. Moreover, the court found that no agent of the state
implied that the land would be suitable for agriculture prior to
Carpenter's applying for a loan. Thus, any possibility of misrepre-
sentation was eliminated.123
In Aviation Associates, Ltd. (AA) v. TEMSCO Helicopters,
Inc., 24 TEMSCO, a commercial air taxi business, purchased
Westflight, a competitor, from AA.1' As part of the transaction,
Charles Slagle, the sole general partner of Westflight, entered into
115. Id.
116. Id
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1183.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1184.
123. Id. at 1185.
124. 881 P.2d 1127 (Alaska 1994).
125. Id. at 1129.
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a seven-year covenant not to compete with TEMSCO. 26 Subse-
quently, TEMSCO obtained a judgment in superior court for
violation of the covenant. 7 AA appealed, objecting to the
superior court's jury instructions as to what constituted "substantial
involvement" by Slagle in a business competing with TEMSCO.'"
The Alaska Supreme Court upheld the jury instruction which
permitted the jury to find that preparatory or planning steps taken
by Slagle could violate the covenant, as the instruction further
required a finding that the substantial steps taken ultimately
resulted in actual competition.29 The court reasoned that the
covenant was intended to prevent Slagle from taking such substan-
tial steps, "since the parties intended that the covenant would
prevent Slagle from setting up a new air taxi business in competi-
tion with TEMSCO.""
Geolar, Inc. v. GilbertCommonwealth, Inc, concerned an
appeal by Geolar from a grant of summary judgment in favor of
Gilbert/Commonwealth, Inc., Homer Electric's agent, on Geolar's
claim of intentional interference with contractual relations. 32
Homer Electric had retained Geolar's services to clear one of three
portions of a planned right-of-way for an electric transmission line
from Homer to Soldotna." Geolar won the contract by submit-
ting the low bid to Gilbert, whom Homer Electric had hired to
provide management and engineering services for the entire
project."3 The dispute centered on the interpretation of which
trees constituted "white spruce" for the purposes of the contract.
126. Id. The covenant states in part that Slagle "shall not, directly or
indirectly, whether as owner, shareholder, director, agent, employee, investor, or
in any other capacity whatsoever compete with TEMSCO, or its successors or
assigns, in the operation of a commercial air taxi business... within all areas of
Alaska south of Yukatat." Id.
127. Id. at 1130.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1132 (citing De Long Corp. v. Lucas, 176 F. Supp. 104 (S.D.N.Y.
1959), affd, 278 F.2d 804 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 364 U.S. 833 (1960)(setting forth
the substantial steps test under which affirmative steps that go beyond the
planning stage may become actual competition)).
130. Id.
131. 874 P.2d 937 (Alaska 1994).
132. Id. at 940. The case also involved Homer Electric's appeal of the damage
award against it for breach of contract with Geolar. The Alaska Supreme Court
affirmed that award. Id. at 943.
133. Id. at 939.
134. Id.
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Such trees had to be cut into smaller lengths than other species and
hence were more costly to clear.135 Geolar alleged that Gilbert
had purposefully made its performance of the contract unreason-
ably difficult in order to either force Geolar to accept Gilbert's
interpretation of "white spruce" or to drive Geolar out of busi-
ness.
136
In ruling upon Geolar's tort claim of intentional interference
with contract, the Alaska Supreme Court considered the issue of
whether "an agent can be liable for intentionally interfering with
a contract between its principal and a third party.'' 137 The court
focused on whether Gilbert's conduct was privileged or justi-
fied. 3 8 The court noted that its prior decisions suggested that an
agent of a party to a contract may interfere with it if the agent
"tpossesses a direct financial interest in the contract" and is
motivated by the desire to protect the principal's economic
interest.39 However, rather than adopt this standard, the court
opted to apply the related test set forth by the Second Restatement
of Torts, which gives an agent privilege to interfere in its principal's
contract so long as the agent (1) does not act wrongfully, and (2)
acts in the principal's, rather than the agent's, financial interest.40
The court noted that "'the question of justification for invading
the contractual interest of another is normally one for the trier of
fact, particularly where the evidence is in conflict.""41  Thus, in
order to ascertain whether Gilbert had acted to protect Homer
Electric's economic interest, the trier of fact must first hear all of
135. Id. Geolar had achieved the low bid by counting Lutz spruce, a hybrid of
Sitka and white spruce, as "other species," whereas Gilbert and Homer Electric
insisted that these trees should be considered "white spruce" under the contract.
II.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 940.
138. Id. The court stated that the tort of intentional interference with
contractual relations consists of the following elements: "proof that (1) a contract
existed, (2) that defendant... knew of the contract and intended to induce a
breach, (3) the contract was breached, (4) defendant's wrongful conduct
engendered the breach, (5) the breach caused the plaintiff's damages, and (6) the
defendant's conduct was not justified." Id. (citing RAN Corp. v. Hudesman, 823
P.2d 646, 648 (Alaska 1991)) (quoting Knight v. American Guard & Alert, Inc.,
714 P.2d 788, 793 (Alaska 1986)).
139. Id.
140. RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 770 (1979).
141. Geolar, Inc., 874 P.2d at 941 (quoting Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Aurora
Air Serv., Inc., 604 P.2d 1090, 1094 (Alaska 1979)).
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the relevant evidence.14 Accordingly, the court reversed the
summary judgment grant and remanded Geolar's claim for
trial. 43
C. Commercial Law
In Security Pacific Bank, N.A. v. Haines Terminal and Highway
Co., Inc.,' the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the award of an
offset payment to Haines Terminal, an unsecured creditor. 45
Security Pacific, a secured creditor, paid the amount to the account
debtor Weyerhaeuser, who sold lumber belonging to the company
in default.'46 The court held that, since the debtor held no equity
in the lumber sold to pay off its secured debts, Haines Terminal
suffered no injury from the sale.'47 As an account debtor, the
company with the right of setoff, Weyerhaeuser, had a superior
claim to the secured creditor, Security Pacific, and thus a claim
"necessarily superior" to that of the unsecured creditor Haines
Terminal.' 4
D. Insurance Law
In Cox v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co.,149 the Alaska
Supreme Court interpreted the phrase "immediate medical treat-
ment" in a motorcycle liability insurance policy to mean that all
insured medical care is covered "up until that point where
treatment becomes recuperative or rehabilitative in nature.'
50
The court noted that the terms "recuperative" and "rehabilitative"
are not self-defining. However, it declined to provide a precise test
because drawing the line of coverage in a particular case necessi-
tates a "fact-based inquiry.' ' m
142. Id.; see also Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Aurora Air Serv. Inc., 604 P.2d
1090 (Alaska 1979); Waldinger Corp. v. CRS Group Eng'rs, Inc., 775 F.2d 781 (7th
Cir. 1985).
143. Geolar, Inc. 874 P.2d at 941.
144. 869 P.2d 156 (Alaska 1994).
145. Id
146. Id. at 158.
147. Id. at 158-59.
148. Id. at 160.
149. 869 P.2d 467 (Alaska 1994).
150. Id. at 468 (citing JoHN A. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE,
§ 4901 at 222 (1981)).
151. Id. at 469.
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Nevertheless, the court did offer the following guidelines to aid
in determining whether particular medical treatment qualifies as
"immediate": (1) on-site first aid and emergency room-type care
are clearly included and (2) any medical treatment, directly related
to the insured event and not the result of an intervening cause, and
which is reasonably believed necessary to prevent serious medical
consequences, will generally be covered." Based on these
guidelines, the court reversed the ruling that the language of the
policy limited coverage to first aid care given prior to hospital
admission.'53
In Bering Strait School District. v. RLI Insurance Co., 4 the
Alaska Supreme Court interpreted issues regarding civil authority
exclusion and like kind and quality provisions in insurance
contracts. RLI refused to pay to upgrade a school it had rebuilt in
order to meet revised building code requirements.5 In the
insuring agreement's civil authority clause, RLI disclaimed any
coverage for "loss or increased cost occasioned by . . . any
ordinance or law . . .. ",6 The like kind and quality clause re-
quired RLI to replace the loss with "material of like kind and
quality... without allowance for any increased cost [due to] any
ordinance or law .... "157
The court dismissed RLI's defense based on the civil authority
clause by applying the principle that insurance policies are contracts
of adhesion which should be interpreted in accordance with the
reasonable expectations of the insured. 8 The court concluded
that the School District, in purchasing a replacement cost policy,
intended to be able to replace the building without cost.'59 In
any event, the court found that the "occasioned" by an ordinance
clause was inapplicable. The fire, not the ordinance, caused the
augmented cost." In addition, the court held that the like kind
and quality provision applies only to replacements which are
152. Id. at 469-70.
153. Id. at 470.
154. 873 P.2d 1292, 1295 (Alaska 1994).
155. Id. at 1293.
156. Id. at 1294.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1295.
160. Id. at 1297.
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"fundamentally" different in nature, as opposed to a new version
of the old structure.16'
Justice Compton dissented, emphasizing that the civil authority
clause excluded payment for either loss or increased cost and that
while the loss may have been occasioned by the fire, the increased
cost was occasioned by the current building codes. 62
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The Alaska Supreme Court's decisions in 1994 concerning
constitutional law addressed issues peculiar to Alaska as well as
issues that are currently of great national interest. These provoca-
tive cases included a landlord's attempt to secure the right to
discriminate based on marital status and a challenge to the passage
by voter initiative of term limits for legislators.
Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission63 involved
an appeal from the Anchorage Equal Rights Commission's
(AERC) ruling that Swanner's refusal to rent apartments to
unmarried couples was unlawful discrimination based on marital
status under Anchorage Municipal Code section 5.20.020 and
Alaska Statutes section 18.80.240.'64 Swanner challenged the
ruling on the ground that the applicable ordinance and statute
violated his right to free exercise of religion under the United
States and Alaska Constitutions. He also argued that the AERC
decision-making procedure did not afford him due process of
lawv. 65
In proceedings before the AERC, Swanner contended that he
did not discriminate based on marital status. On the contrary, he
argued that he merely refused to rent to those whom he expected
to engage in conduct, cohabitation, which conflicted with his
religious beliefs.'" The AERC appointed a hearing examiner,
who recommended that an order be entered in favor of the
complainants. 67 Pursuant to the AERC's rules of procedure,
each party had ten days after receipt of the recommendation in
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1298-99 (Compton, J., dissenting).
163. 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska 1994).
164. Id. at 276-77; ANCHORAGE MUN. CODE § 5.20.020; ALASKA STAT.
§ 18.80.240 (1994).
165. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 277.
166. Id. at 278.
167. Id. at 277.
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which to raise written objections. The AERC would then review
and modify the decision as needed." Swanner failed to make
any objections within the ten day limit, and the decision became
final. 69 Swanner then appealed to the superior court, which held
that (1) Swanner's refusal to rent was based on unlawful discrimina-
tion, (2) the state and municipal anti-discrimination laws did not
violate Swanner's right to free exercise of his religion and (3) the
AERC's automatic adoption of the examiner's recommendation did
not deprive Swanner of due process of law.' The Alaska
Supreme Court ruled against Swanner on the basis of its decision
in Foreman v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 7' a case involv-
ing a landlord's refusal to rent to an unmarried couple.'72 In
Foreman, the court held that because the landlord would have
rented to the couple if they had been married, and refused to rent
to them only after learning that they were not, his conduct
constituted unlawful discrimination.' 73
Swanner then argued that the anti-discrimination laws violated
his right to the free exercise of his religion under the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 4 Swanner urged
the court to apply the "compelling state interest" test articulated
by the United States Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner."7
However, the court noted that in a more recent decision, Employ-
ment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith,16 the United
States Supreme Court had "rejected applying the Sherbert test
where the law ... is . . . not directed at any particular religious
practice."'" Swanner conceded that the laws in question were
not directed, either facially or by impact, at any specific religious
group' 78 Under Smith, an exemption from such a law can be
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. 779 P.2d 1199 (Alaska 1989).
172. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 278.
173. Foreman, 779 P.2d at 1203.
174. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 279; U.S. CONST. amend. I.
175. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
176. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
177. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 279 (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 885) (holding that laws
of neutral and general applicability need not meet the standard of compelling
governmental interest even where the law incidentally burdens a particular
religious practice).
178. Id. at 280.
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granted only if another constitutionally protected right is invoked
as well. Finding that this was not the situation in Swanner's case,
the court held that the anti-discrimination laws did not violate
Swanner's First Amendment right to the free exercise of his
religion.179
The court noted that it may interpret the Free Exercise Clause
of the Alaska Constitution'80 to give greater protection than that
granted by the United States Supreme Court in its decisions
interpreting the First Amendment. 1  The Alaska Supreme
Court, in Frank v. State,'" adopted the Sherbert test for judicial
exemptions to facially neutral laws that incidentally burden
religious beliefs." The court noted that three requirements must
be met in order for a judicial exemption to be granted to a facially
neutral law: "(1) a religion is involved, (2) the conduct in question
is religiously based, and (3) the claimant is sincere in his/her
religious belief'"" Where these criteria are satisfied, then the state
may affect religious conduct and practices only if they pose a
significant threat to peace, order, or public safety, or where the
governmental interests are "of the highest order and . . . not
otherwise served."'"
The court found that Swanner clearly satisfied the first and
third requirements. 6 As for the second, the court relied on
Frank for the proposition that free exercise rights are not limited
"tonly to . . . religious rituals, ceremonies, or practices[,]" but
include any "practice deeply rooted in religion."'" The court
concluded that Swanner met the second requirement as well, since
his refusal to rent to unmarried couples was "not without an
arguable basis in some tenets of the diverse Christian faith."'
Thus, the ultimate question became whether the state's interest in
preventing discrimination based upon marital status was of
179. Id.
180. ALASKA CONST., art. I, § 4.
181. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 280 (citing Roberts v. State, 458 P.2d 340, 342
(Alaska 1969)).
182. 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979).
183. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 281.
184. Id. (citing Frank, 604 P.2d at 1071; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-
16 (1972)).
185. Id. (quoting Frank, 604 P.2d at 1070).
186. Id.
187. Id. (citing Frank, 604 P.2d at 1072-73).
188. Id. at 282.
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sufficiently high order so as to overcome Swanner's legitimate
religious practice."8 9
The court began its analysis of the state's interest by distin-
guishing between two types of state interests: (1) a "derivative"
interest, where the state does not object per se to the individual's
desired activity, but is concerned with an independent factor
affected by the activity, and (2) a "transactional" interest, where
the state opposes the activity itself." The court characterized the
activity involved in Frank, moose hunting, as a derivative activi-
ty,' since the state did not object to moose hunting in itself, but
merely banned it periodically to ensure adequate moose popula-
tions.192 In contrast, the court held that the government has a
transactional interest in eradicating discrimination."9 Since any
level of discrimination is harmful to those discriminated against, the
court concluded that there can be no individual exemptions without
sacrificing the acknowledged compelling purpose for which the
Alaska Legislature enacted the anti-discrimination laws. 94
Relying on the distinction between conduct that is based entirely
on belief and voluntary conduct, the court dismissed Swanner's
argument that enforcement of the laws would force him to give up
either his religion or his business. 95 The court held that Swan-
ner's decision to rent apartments represented voluntary con-
duct.' 96 As such, the court refused to grant Swanner a judicial
exemption and concluded that enforcement of the anti-discrimina-
tion laws did not infringe.upon his free exercise rights under the
Alaska Constitution. 97
On Swanner's third point that the AERC had deprived him of
due process of law, the court first noted that the hearing examiner
could not make a final ruling, but only a recommendation to the
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. In Frank, the Alaska Supreme Court exempted a Central Alaska
Athabascan Indian from state hunting regulations because the Indian sought to
obtain moose meat out of season for a traditional funeral potlatch. Frank, 604
P.2d at 1073.
192. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 282.
193. Id. at 282-83.
194. Id
195. Id. at 283 (citing Seward Chapel, Inc. v. City of Seward, 655 P.2d 1293,
1299 (Alaska 1982)).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 284.
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full AERC, a body with ample authority to determine Swanner's
culpability.'98 The court held that the AERC's failure to notify
Swanner personally that the recommendation would become final
unless he made objections within ten days did not deprive Swanner
of due process. Having participated in the action for seven months,
he was fully aware of the "pendency of the action" and could have
easily discovered the ten-day requirement by reading the Anchor-
age Municipal Code."9
Underwood v. State' addressed the issue of the constitution-
ality of a 1992 amendment to the permanent fund dividend (PFD)
statutes. 2 ' The amendment to Alaska Statutes section 43.23.-
005, signed by Governor Hickel on March 31, 1992, changed
the date of residency in Alaska upon which qualification for a 1993
PFD was based from April 1, 1992 to January 1, 1992.2 3 Under-
wood, relying on the April I eligibility date, moved to Alaska in
March of 1992 specifically intending to qualify for a 1993 PFD. 4
However, due to the amendment, he did not qualify and brought
suit challenging the amendment's constitutionality.2 5
The Alaska Supreme Court rejected each of Underwood's
claims. First, the court held that, as the amendment bears a "'fair
and substantial"' relation to the legitimate governmental objective
of administrative efficiency, it trumps Underwood's mere economic
interest in a PFD.' The court then concluded that as of March
31, 1992, the effective date of the amendment, Underwood
possessed only an inchoate expectancy of a 1993 PFD, rather than
a vested right.' Thus, the court ruled that no due process
violation existed. 3
The court also rejected Underwood's assertion that the
amendment constituted an ex post facto law in violation of the
Alaska Constitution.m°9 The court reasoned that as the amend-
198. Id.
199. Id. at 285.
200. 881 P.2d 322 (Alaska 1994).
201. Id. at 323.
202. ALASKA STAT. § 42.23.005 (Supp. 1994).
203. Underwood, 881 P.2d at 324.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 326 (citations omitted).
207. Id. at 327.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 328; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 15.
1995]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
ment did not affect any vested fights and "did not unfairly or
unreasonably impinge [Underwood's] property rights or settled
expectations[,]" the prohibition on ex post facto laws did not
apply.2"' Finally, the court held that the state was not equitably
estopped from denying Underwood the 1993 PFD. It found that
the state had neither encouraged his move to Alaska nor guaran-
teed that he would qualify for a 1993 PFD.21a
In Alaskans for Legislative Reform v. State,212 the Alaska
Supreme Court, per curiam, held that the Alaska Constitution
prohibits the use of a voter initiative to establish term limits for
state legislators.213 The case stemmed from the governor's refusal
to grant certification of the initiative on the ground that a constitu-
tional amendment provided the only permissible means of imposing
term limits.214
The Alaska Supreme Court adopted the opinion of the
superior court judge as its opinion. The superior court ruled that
the qualifications for legislators expressed in the constitution are
exclusive 2 5 and may not be contradicted by voter initiative.216
The superior court then considered whether term limits rose to the
level of a "qualification" as opposed to the plaintiff's assertion that
they constituted a mere "precondition. ' 217  Noting that term
limits would categorically deny certain persons the right to run for
state offices and could not be avoided by write-in votes,211 the
court held that term limits enacted by voter initiative represented
"direct" and constitutionally impermissible qualifications.29
210. Id. at 327-28.
211. Id. at 328.
212. 887 P.2d 960 (Alaska 1994).
213. Id. at 961. The proposed initiative would limit state legislators to two
consecutive senate terms, four consecutive house terms, or eight consecutive years
in any combination of house or senate. Consecutive is defined therein as less than
eight years between each term of service. Id. at 961-62.
214. Id. at 962.
215. Sections 2, 3 and 5 of article II contain the qualifications required to be a
state legislator. The qualifications cover the following: voting status, residency
requirements, age minimums, length of terms and several conflict of interest rules.
ALASKA CONST. art. II, §§ 2-3, 5.
216. Alaskans for Legislative Reform, 887 P.2d at 963 (citations omitted).
217. Id. at 964.
218. Id. at 965.
219. Id. at 966.
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In Baker v. State, 0 Baker challenged the constitutionality of
Alaska Administrative Code title 5, section 39.107, which requires
the holder of a valid CFEC fishing permit to be "physically present
on board the vessel from which the net gear is operated" and to
"tpersonally operate or assist the operation of mobile net gear."' l
The defendants challenged the regulation under the equal protec-
tion clause of the Alaska Constitution, as well as under section 17
of article VIII,m which mandates the equal application of all
laws concerning the "'use or disposal of natural resources [by] ...
all persons similarly situated with reference to the subject matter
and purpose to be served by the ... regulation.""
The Alaska Court of Appeals first noted that the standard of
review for an article VIII challenge is slightly more stringent than
for an equal protection challenge. 4  Due to "the high impor-
tance of citizens' equal access to natural resources," the Alaska
Supreme Court has consistently required the state "to demonstrate
both an 'important' legislative purpose and means narrowly
tailored to accomplish that purpose." This language nonetheless is
substantially similar to an equal protection analysis.'
Baker argued that the relevant section of the administrative
code was not narrowly tailored. He asserted that the mandatory
presence of the permit holder on the fishing vessel did not advance
the state's legitimate goal of regulating commercial fishingY6
The court of appeals noted that the Alaska Supreme Court
previously had approved the creation of alienable commercial
fishing permits by the legislature on the grounds that, by linking the
purchase price of the permits to the health of the environment,
holders would be encouraged to engage in long-term conservation
measures. 7  Similarly, the court of appeals reasoned that by
requiring the presence of the holder, the legislature "prevents
permit-holders from establishing themselves as 'absentee land-
lords"' and ensures that the fishing crew has a "long-term interest
220. 878 P.2d 642 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
221. Id. at 643 (quoting ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 39.107(1991)).
222. Id. at 644.
223. Id. (quoting ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 17).
224. Id.; see also McDowell v. State, 785 P.2d 1, 10 (Alaska 1989); Gilbert v.
State Dep't of Fish & Game, 803 P.2d 391, 398 (Alaska 1990).
225. Baker, 878 P.2d at 644 n.1; Alaska Fish Spotters Assn. v. State, 838 P.2d
798, 803-04 (Alaska 1992).
226. Baker, 878 P.2d at 645.
227. Id. (citing State v. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d 1184, 1194-95 (Alaska 1983)).
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in the health of the fishery resource."' The court concluded
that absent such a regulation, "economic forces might encourage
[fishers] to take advantage of their limited opportunity for higher
profit by adhering less strictly to conservation and gear limitation
regulationa" 9  Thus, the court held that the regulation "fur-
ther[ed] important governmental interests," and it rejected the
constitutional challengesO 0
Gonzales v. Safeway Stores, Ina"3 involved a constitutional
challenge to the Alaska dram shop statute, which limits the civil
liability of any provider of alcoholic beverages to injuries caused by
providing alcohol to a "'drunken person."'" 2 Licensed providers
of alcoholic beverages are also given protection from liability unless
they, or their agents, are criminally negligent in providing alcoholic
beverages to a drunken person. 3  Gonzales brought an action
against Safeway Stores, a licensed provider of alcohol, because the
driver of the car in which he was injured purchased schnapps from
one of the defendant's stores.' The jury rendered a special
verdict that Safeway was not criminally negligent in selling the
alcohol, and Gonzales appealed, alleging that the dram shop statute
violated equal protection and due process.'
The Alaska Supreme Court, applying its traditional sliding-
scale approach to equal protection, listed three bases on which the
dram shop statute does not discriminate against similarly situated
classes. At common law, no liability was imposed by sellers of
intoxicating spirits. Therefore, the dram shop statute expanded,
rather than narrowed, the rights of potential litigantsP6 Second,
no other industry is similarly situated with respect to the existence
of a comparable tort remedy. The court pointed out that the
closest example, providers of food and non-alcoholic beverages, are
228. Id,
229. IM
230. Id. at 64647.
231. 882 P.2d 389 (Alaska 1994).
232. Id. at 393 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 04.21.020 (1990)). A "drunken
person" is defined in the statute as a person whose conduct is substantially and
visibly impaired as a result of the consumption of alcohol. ALASKA STAT.
§ 04.21.080(b)(8) (1990).
233. ALASKA STAT. § 04.16.030 (1990).
234. Gonzales, 882 P.2d at 392.
235. Id. at 395. Gonzales brought challenges under both the United States and
Alaska Constitutions. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; ALASKA CONST. art I, §§ 1 & 7.
236. Gonzales, 882 P.2d at 397.
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liable for defective products. 7 No comparison can be made with
respect to alcoholic beverages, where the danger lies in the
consumption, not in any defect in the product itself z8 Third, the
statute does impose the higher standard of criminal negligence, but
it also abrogates the plaintiff's duty to prove that the liquor sold
was the legal cause of the injury, a trade-off that does not implicate
equal protection z 9
As for Gonzales' due process claim, the court considered the
imposition of a higher standard of negligence for liquor vendors to
be rational because the consumer of the alcohol is the one most
responsible for any injuries caused by intoxication.24 Therefore,
the statute does not violate due process either.2 '
V. CRIMINAL LAW
A. Constitutional Protections
1. Search and Seizure. In Bergman v. State,242 the Alaska
Court of Appeals held that whiskey seized by postal authorities
pursuant to their authority to inspect fourth class packages could
be turned over to law enforcement officers without a warrant.243
Bergman contended that the warrantless search and seizure of the
packages violated both the United States and Alaska Constitutions'
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.2' Under
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
article I, section 14 of the Alaska Constitution, the police ordinarily
may not search a package without a warrant unless the search falls
within a recognized exception. 45 One exception to the warrant
requirement permits the warrantless inspection of fourth-class
packages.24 In this case, the Alaska Court of Appeals reasoned
that once the whiskey had been lawfully exposed to the postal
authorities, the surrender of the whiskey to law enforcement
237. Id.
238. ML
239. Id.
240. Id. at 397-98.
241. Id
242. 874 P.2d 958 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
243. Id at 961.
244. Id at 960-61.
245. Id. at 961 (citation omitted).
246. Id. (citations omitted).
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authorities without a warrant constituted no greater invasion of
privacy.' Therefore, the warrantless search and seizure did not
violate the Federal or Alaska Constitutions.24
In Hamilton v. Municipality of Anchorage,249 the Alaska
Court of Appeals considered an appeal of a conviction for refusing
to take a breath test after being arrested for driving while intoxicat-
ed. Hamilton argued that the arresting officer's refusal of his offer
to take a blood test, rather than a breath test, violated his due
process "right to gather or preserve exculpatory evidence." 0
The municipal regulation in question specifically required the
suspect to take a breath test.25' The court observed that its prior
decisions authorized the legislature to specify the chemical test
motorists must take.' 2 The court also noted that the use of a
breath test, as opposed to a blood test, advanced the government's
"interest in the orderly and expeditious processing of DWI
arrestees, in discouraging undue delay in testing.., and in having
arresting police officers return as quickly as possible to their patrol
duties." 3 Conceding that these governmental interests may not
be "compelling," the court stated that they need not be as
motorists have no fundamental right to choose the form of
testing.' Thus, the court found no violation of due process and
affirmed the conviction.'
In Atkinson v. State, 6 Atkinson was convicted of two counts
of misconduct involving a controlled substance in the fourth
degree.' 7  Atkinson's neighbor called the police after finding
marijuana in his minor son's possession. The son admitted to
stealing the drugs from Atkinson's house. 8 The police obtained
247. Id. (citing Bell v. State, 519 P.2d 804, 806 (Alaska 1974)).
248. Id.
249. 878 P.2d 653 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
250. Id. at 654-55.
251. Id. at 654 (citing ANCHORAGE MUN. CODE § 9.28.022-C; ALASKA STAT.
§ 28.35.031(f) (1994)). Both of these provisions are known as "implied consent"
statutes, as the motorist's consent to the testing is implied upon arrest. Id.
252. Id. at 655 (citing Municipality of Anchorage v. Ray, 854 P.2d 740, 750
(Alaska Ct. App. 1993)).
253. Id.
254. Id. at 655-56 (citing Ray, 854 P.2d at 749).
255. Id. at 656.
256. 869 P.2d 486 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
257. Id. at 489.
258. Id.
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a search warrant for Atkinson's house, and arrested Atkinson upon
finding in his basement numerous marijuana plants and equipment
for growing the drug. 9
On appeal, Atkinson advanced several arguments. First, he
contended that the juvenile's testimony on which the warrant's
issuance was based did not pass the Aguilar-Spinelli test.2 The
Alaska Court of Appeals noted that the testimony satisfied the first
prong of the test, or first-hand knowledge, because the juvenile's
statements were based on personal observation of the plants.O1
As for the second prong, credibility, the magistrate who issued the
warrant specifically found that the juvenile was a criminal infor-
mant whose statements required corroboration.262 The court held
the self-incriminating nature of the juvenile's admission that he had
repeatedly stolen drugs from the defendant's house was sufficiently
corroborative.2 3
The court also considered Atkinson's claim that the police's
failure to record the informant's interrogation violated Atkinson's
due process rights under the rule set forth in Stephan v. State? 4
Applying the plain error standard of review, as Atkinson had first
raised this issue on appeal, the court of appeals determined the
Stephan rule was inapposite to the instant case. Stephan, the court
ruled, does not suggest a need to record an interrogation in order
to protect the due process rights of third parties, such as Atkin-
son.
265
In Milton v. State,266 Milton appealed the denial of his motion
to suppress the evidentiary use of cocaine seized during a warrant-
less search of his private bedroom by state troopers acting under
259. Id. at 489-90.
260. Id. at 490; see Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). The Aguilar-Spinelli test is a two pronged test: first,
the magistrate must be presented with evidence sufficient to find that the
informant's statements are based on first-hand knowledge, and second he must
determine that such information is credible. Atkinson, 869 P.2d at 490 (citing
State v. Bianchi, 761 P.2d 127, 130 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988)).
261. Atkinson, 869 P.2d at 490.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 491.
264. Id. at 493 (citing Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985)(holding
that an unexcused failure to record electronically a custodial interrogation
conducted in a location of detention violates a suspect's due process rights)).
265. Id. at 494.
266. 879 P.2d 1031 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
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the direction of his custodial housemate's parole officer.267
Milton had agreed to allow his friend Gutierrez to be released into
his third-party custody. He also had accepted responsibility to
report any violations of Gutierrez's parole, which included a ban on
the possession of any illegal drugs or alcohol.' Gutierrez's
probation officer suspected that he was not complying with his
parole, and ordered a warrantless search of the residence.269
During the search, cocaine was found in a suitcase located in the
closet of Milton's private bedroom."O Milton moved to suppress
the evidence on the ground that its discovery was an unreasonable
invasion of his privacy 7'
The Alaska Court of Appeals stated that a warrantless search
of an individual's home is "'per se unreasonable... unless it falls
within one of the limited exceptions to the warrant require-
ment.""' A search by one's probation officer is a recognized
exception. However, the court held that Milton nonetheless
"retain[ed] a limited expectation of privacy" in agreeing to house
Gutierrez, despite the latter's probationary status zr3 The court
ruled that a warrantless search may only properly cover the areas
of the house "that the officer has reason to believe [are] owned,
possessed, or controlled by the probationer," regardless of the
probationer's physical capability of access. 4 Since the officers'
search included areas, such as Milton's closet, that were potentially
not within Gutierrez's ownership, possession, or control, the court
vacated Milton's conviction and remanded the case.275
In Higgins v. State, the Alaska Court of Appeals reversed the
denial of the defendant's motion to suppress evidence of statements
made to the police. 76 Higgins, whose residence was searched on
a warrant, was questioned at length by a police officer who did not
advise her of her Miranda' rights, but who did tell her that she
267. Id. at 1034.
268. Id. at 1033.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 1033-34.
271. Id. at 1034.
272. Id. (quoting Harrison v. State, 860 P.2d 1280, 1283 (Alaska Ct. App.
1993)).
273. Id. at 1035.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 1036.
276. 887 P.2d 966 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
277. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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was not under arrest at the momentY Higgins was eventually
indicted as a result of her confession that she had bought and
possessed cocaineY- Although it found that a reasonable person
would believe that they were in a custodial situation, the trial court
denied the motion to suppress. Higgins subjectively believed that
she was free to leave at any point during the conversation.
The court noted that under federal and Alaska case law, the
relevant standard is objective. The issue to be considered is
whether under the "totality of the circumstances, objectively
viewed," a reasonable person in the defendant's shoes would have
believed themselves in the custody of the police."8
2. Miscellaneous. The Alaska Court of Appeals reversed the
assault conviction of a prison inmate in Bright v. State.' The
court held that the trial court's decision to locate the trial in the
prison in which Bright was being held, the Spring Creek Correc-
tional Center, violated his right to a public trial.W The prosecu-
tor first suggested holding the trial at the prison because the state
wished to subpoena several of Bright's fellow inmates to testify
about the assault, which allegedly took place there.' The trial
court ruled without elaboration that the trial would be held at
Spring Creek.' Bright moved to have the judge reconsider,
arguing that holding the trial in the prison would violate his right
to a public trial under the Alaska Constitution. The trial court
denied the motion but issued detailed findings of fact which
addressed the lack of secure facilities in the courthouse in which to
adequately house the subpoenaed prisoners and to ensure the
safety and privacy of the juryYW The trial court also found that,
due to local familiarity with the prison, the prospective jurors
278. Higgins, 887 P.2d at 967.
279. Id at 968.
280. Id. at 969.
281. Id (citing, inter alia, Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984); Hunter
v. State, 590 P.2d 888 (Alaska 1979); Edwards v. State, 842 P.2d 1281 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1992)).
282. 875 P.2d 100, 101 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
283. Id. at 101.
284. Id. at 102-03.
285. Id. at 103.
286. Id.; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 11.
287. Bright, 875 P.2d at 103-04.
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would not be inappropriately influenced by having the trial staged
there.
The Alaska Court of Appeals first noted that "[flor a
thousand years, Anglo-American law has embodied the doctrine
that trials should be open to the public." 9 The court observed
that not only do the Alaska Constitution and the Sixth Amendment
of the United States Constitution guarantee an individual defendant
a public trial,, but society has a vested right in open access to
criminal trials.2" The court refused to "flatly . . . prohibit[]
holding a criminal trial in a prison under any and all circumstanc-
es," but it did declare that the "decision to hold a trial in a prison
must be subjected to the strictest scrutiny, and that decision must
be supported by compelling reasons., 29 1 The court held that the
trial court abused its discretion by not giving proper notice of and
hearing on the location decision, by making findings without
support in the record and based on criteria not specific to Bright's
case and by not considering alternative means by which to alleviate
security problems in the courthouse.2 2
J.R.N. v. State29 concerned a minor charged as a juvenile for
an offense equivalent to first degree murder.294 Due in part to
information provided by J.R.N. in his confession, the superior court
determined that the nature of J.R.N.'s offense warranted a waiver
of juvenile jurisdiction.295 J.R.N. argued against the validity of his
confession on the ground that his right to immediate parental
notice of arrest.. had been violated.29  The superior court
concluded that J.R.N. had knowingly and voluntarily waived his
right to parental notice.298 J.R.N. appealed this determination,
asserting that he "could not have waived a right of which he was
unaware."
299
288. Id. at 104.
289. Id. at 105 (citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,580
(1980); Renkel v. State, 807 P.2d 1087 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991)).
290. Id.
291. Id. at 109.
292. Id. at 109-10.
293. 884 P.2d 175 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
294. Id at 176.
295. Id.
296. ALASKA R. DELINQUENCY 7(b).
297. JR.N., 884 P.2d at 176.
298. Id.
299. Id.
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The Alaska Court of Appeals rejected J.R.N.'s argument that
the police were required to provide him with an express and formal
explanation, similar to a Miranda warning,3°° of his right to
parental notice.301 The court noted that the Miranda rule proce-
dure is not a general precondition to the relinquishment of all
rights, but only extends to those fundamental constitutional rights
that are essential in order to protect the integrity of a trial.3 2
Thus, the court of appeals found that J.R.N.'s negative response
when the police expressly asked him whether he wished to call his
parents constituted a voluntary and informed waiver of his right to
parental notice.03
Smith v. State'° involved the constitutionality of supplemen-
tal conditions of parole given in a mandatory parole case. These
conditions included requirements that an inmate convicted of
sexual abuse of a minor not reside in a household with minors, not
have contact with the victim or other minors, not use drugs or
alcohol and permit tests and searches for alcohol or drugs.305
Smith challenged the constitutionality of the supplemental
conditions on several grounds. First, he claimed that the supple-
mental parole conditions violated his procedural due process rights
by denying him reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard. °
Second, he argued that the fact that mandatory parolees are not
permitted to appear before the parole board prior to their release,
while discretionary parolees are provided such a hearing, violated
his right to equal protection of the law.3° Finally, Smith claimed
that since probation officers perform a judicial function, their
placement in the executive branch violated the separation of
powers doctrine.03
The Alaska Supreme Court ruled that the 120-days notice
appellant was given constituted procedural due process.301 In
addition, the fact that appellant was allowed to submit written
material protesting the conditions of his parole satisfied the
300. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
301. J.R.N., 884 P.2d at 177.
302. 1& (citations omitted).
303. Id.
304. 872 P.2d 1218 (Alaska 1994).
305. Id. at 1221.
306. Id. at 1222.
307. Id. at 1221.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 1224.
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requirement that he have an opportunity to be heard.31° The
court further held that Smith's equal protection rights were not
transgressed. It found that because mandatory parolees and
discretionary parolees are not similarly situated, they need not be
treated similarly.3 ' Finally, the court ruled that the probation
function is one that is shared by both the judicial and executive
branches. Hence, the placement of parole officers in the executive
branch did not represent a separation of powers violation.312
In Todd v. Alaska,313 the Alaska Court of Appeals held that
neither separate convictions and punishment for assault and murder
nor separate convictions and punishment for felony murder and
robbery violated the prohibition on double jeopardy.314 Todd was
convicted of first-degree robbery of a bar owner, second-degree
murder of the bar owner and third-degree assault of a bar employ-
ee.3 5 Todd claimed that he could be sentenced solely for murder
because the double jeopardy clauses of the Federal and Alaska
Constitutions prohibit multiple punishments for the same act.316
The Alaska Court of Appeals turned first to the question of
whether Todd could be punished separately for the third-degree
assault.1 7 The court noted that the Alaska Supreme Court has
held that a defendant who assaults two or more people in a single
act commits separately punishable assaults. 318  Similarly, the
Alaska Supreme Court has held that a reckless act that kills two or
more people constitutes a separately punishable manslaughter for
each victim. 319  Therefore, the court of appeals held that the
defendant was separately punishable for both the assault on the bar
employee and the murder of the bar owner, regardless of whether
they arose from a single act.320
310. Id.
311. Id. at 1226 (citing Ketchikan Gateway Borough v. Breed, 639 P.2d 995,
995-96 (Alaska 1981)).
312. Id. at 1227.
313. 884 P.2d 668 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
314. Id. at 670.
315. Id.
316. Id.; see U.S. CoNsT. amend. V; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 9.
317. Todd, 884 P.2d at 670.
318. Id. (citing Cooper v. State, 595 P.2d 648 (Alaska 1979)).
319. Id. (citing State v. Dunlop, 721 P.2d 648 (Alaska 1986)).
320. Id.
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The court next examined the constitutionality of separate
convictions and punishment for felony murder and robbery 2'
Todd argued that the double jeopardy clause prohibits separate
conviction and punishment for both a greater and a lesser included
offense.3' Todd relied on the Alaska Supreme Court decision in
Tuckfield v. State" and the Alaska Court of Appeals decision in
Hughes v. State.324
In Tuckfield, the Alaska Supreme Court held that the double
jeopardy clause barred conviction for both the greater offense of
rape and the lesser included offense of assault with intent to
commit rape.'2 In Hughes, the court of appeals read Tuckfield
to stand for the proposition that the double jeopardy clause
prohibits conviction for both a greater offense and a lesser included
offense. Consequently, the defendant's conviction in Hughes for
both attempted robbery and manslaughter violated the double
jeopardy clause because the attempted robbery was a lesser
included offense of the manslaughter charge.326
In the instant case, the Alaska Court of Appeals rejected its
prior broa d reading of Tuckfield.32  The court concluded that
Tuckfield should be limited to its facts. Thus, the double jeopardy
clause will only be held to bar separate conviction for both assault
with intent to commit rape and the completed rape.3' The court
determined that the issue of the constitutionality of separate
convictions for robbery and felony murder should be determined
by investigating the legislature's intent in enacting the robbery and
felony murder statutes.3 29  The court examined the legislative
history of the statutes and concluded that the legislature intended
to allow separate convictions for felony murder and for the
underlying felony.33 The court then proceeded to overrule
Hughes explicitly, and held that the double jeopardy clause does
not bar separate convictions for felony murder and robbery, even
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. 621 P.2d 1350 (Alaska 1981).
324. 668 P.2d 842 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
325. Tuckfield, 621 P.2d at 1352.
326. Hughes, 668 P.2d at 844-45.
327. Todd, 884 P.2d at 682.
328. Id. at 681.
329. Id. at 682.
330. Id. at 684.
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though robbery may be a lesser included offense of felony
murder 31
Kochutin v. State32 involved the defendant's appeal from the
disposition of a rehearing in the superior court. The defendant's
convictions for murder and sexual abuse had originally been
reversed by the court of appeals333 because the state had secured
a confession in violation of the rule in Edwards v. Arizona.3 4
The finding of an Edwards violation was based on stipulated facts
that the confession was made while the defendant was in continu-
ous custody after initially invoking his Miranda rights.335 Due to
a subsequent allegation that the defendant had not been in continu-
ous custody during the entire period, the court remanded the case
to the superior court for additional hearings.336 The superior
court found that the defendant had not in fact been in continuous
custody during the period of time, and that suppression of the
confession was not warranted.337 The court of appeals noted that
in originally reversing the convictions, it relied on the uninterrupted
length of incarceration as a contributing factor. It held that "the
break in custody ... support[s] the conclusion that Kochutin
voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. '338 The court vacated its
previous order and affirmed the superior court's original convic-
tions.339
In Hum v. State,' the Alaska Court of Appeals dealt with
a prosecutor's duty to present exculpatory evidence. The court also
examined the retroactivity of the rule announced by the Alaska
Supreme Court in LaVigne v. State,"4 which requires the trial
court to inquire whether the defendant personally chose not to
testify in his own behalf."4
331. Id. at 686.
332. 875 P.2d 778 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
333. See Kochutin v. State, 813 P.2d 298 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
334. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
335. Kochutin, 875 P.2d at 779 (referring to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966)).
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 780.
339. Id.
340. 872 P.2d 189 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
341. 812 P.2d 217 (Alaska 1991).
342. Hum, 872 P.2d at 189.
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Hum was convicted of second-degree murder and assault. On
appeal, he challenged his indictment because the prosecutor failed
to present to the grand jury statements Hum made to two police
officers that he "did not want to shoot" his victims. 43 The court
of appeals observed that while a prosecutor must present exculpa-
tory evidence to the grand jury, 4 the prosecutor is required only
to present evidence "substantially favorable" to the defendant.45
Similarly, exculpatory evidence need not be submitted "if the
omitted evidence would be cumulative."' Thus, the prosecutor
satisfied his obligation to present exculpatory evidence by submit-
ting to the grand jury a 911 call in which Hum asserted his
innocence to the operator.347
Hum next appealed the trial court's denial of his petition for
post-conviction relief' Hum contended that his attorney had
denied him the right to testify in his own behalf by not telling him
that the ultimate choice was Hum's alone.349  Hum asked the
court to apply LaVigne retroactively and to hold that the trial court
should have affirmatively inquired before the close of the defense's
case whether Hum's decision not to testify was an informed and
voluntary decision ° The court declined to so hold, citing the
criteria articulated by the Alaska Supreme Court in Judd v.
State.35' The court concluded that the third criteria, "the effect
on the administration of justice," weighed heavily against a
retroactive application of the rule.35 Potentially thousands of
cases could be re-examined and reversed if the rule were applied
retroactively. Furthermore, the LaVigne court specifically stated
that the rule was intended to "avoid future cases like LaVigne's,"
343. Id. at 190-91.
344. See ALASKA C iM. R. 6(q).
345. Hum, 872 P.2d at 191 (citing Lipscomb v. State, 700 P.2d 1298 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1985)).
346. Id. at 192 (citing Doisher v. State, 632 P.2d 242 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981),
rev'd on other grounds, 658 P.2d 119 (Alaska 1983)).'
347. Id.
348. Id. at 193.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 198.
351. 482 P.2d 273 (Alaska 1971).
352. Hum, 872 P.2d at 198 (quoting State v. Glass, 596 P.2d 10, 13 (Alaska
1979)).
1995]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
which confirmed that the rule was intended to be applied prospec-
tively.353
In Steve v. State,3' the defendant, convicted of the second-
degree sexual abuse of a minor between the ages of thirteen and
sixteen, challenged Alaska Statutes section 11.41.445(b),355 which
places the burden on the defendant to demonstrate that he
reasonably believed that the minor was older than sixteen.3 56
Steve argued that the legislature unconstitutionally required the
defendant to prove a basic element of the offense in enacting the
provision, thus depriving him of due process of law under the
Alaska and the United States Constitutions.357 The Alaska Court
of Appeals traced the history of Alaska Statutes section 11.41.445-
(b). It emphasized that at common law, statutory rape was a strict
liability crime as to the age of the victim. 8 Only in 1978, follow-
ing the publication of the Model Penal Code, was a mistake-of-age
provision adopted in Alaska. That same year, the Alaska Supreme
Court held in State v. Guest59 that there must be a mistake of age
exception to the crime of statutory rape, since "consciousness of
wrongdoing is an essential element of penal liability.' '3' Howev-
er, the Steve court refused to construe Guest to mean that the state
bears the burden of disproving a mistake of age defense raised by
the defendant.36'
The court next undertook a federal constitutional analysis,
concluding that the Federal Constitution does not require the
government to disprove a legislatively created defense that serves
to "justify, excuse, or mitigate the seriousness of what would
otherwise be criminal conduct .... 362 Rather, the state legisla-
tures are empowered to balance society's interest in punishing
353. LaVigne, 812 P.2d at 222 (emphasis added).
354. 875 P.2d 110 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
355. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.445(b) (1989).
356. Id. at 114-15; ALAsKA STAT. § 11.41.445(b) (1989).
357. Steve, 875 P.2d at 115.
358. Id. at 116 ("In Anderson v. State, 384 P.2d 669, 671 (Alaska 1963), our
supreme court recognized (and followed) the common-law rule that persons having
intercourse with children 'do so at their peril."').
359. 583 P.2d 836 (Alaska 1978).
360. Id. at 838-39.
361. Steve, 875 P.2d at 118.
362. Id.; see also Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987); Patterson v. New York,
432 U.S. 197 (1977); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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offenders with the constantly evolving societal standards of
conduct.3 3 Because the Alaska legislature acted within its
acceptable sphere of constitutional power in enacting the mistake
of age provision, Steve was not deprived of due process under the
Federal Constitution by shouldering the burden of proof."
In its analysis of the mistake of age provision under the due
process clause of the Alaska Constitution,36 the court relied
primarily on three cases: Speidel v. State,36 Alex v. State3 67 and
Kimoktoak v. State.3 In Speidel, the Alaska Supreme Court held
that a statute creating a felony offense of "willfully neglecting" to
return a rental car was unconstitutional because it did not require
the state to prove an awareness of wrongdoing on the defendant's
part.369 In Alex, the supreme court subsequently clarified Speidel
to stand for the proposition that the act of which the defendant is
accused must have been a voluntary one, not that the defendant
must have been aware of wrongdoing in general.370 Finally, in
Kimoktoak, the supreme court held Alaska's hit-and-run statute to
be unconstitutional unless an element of scienter were present.
Thus, a defendant could be convicted of failing to remain at the
scene of an accident only if the state proved his or her knowledge
that an accident had occurred.371
Applying this line of case law, the Steve court held that
knowledge of Steve's actions with respect to the minor was
sufficient to warrant criminal liability, regardless of whether Steve
was aware that he was committing an offense.3' The state
therefore satisfied its obligation by proving that Steve voluntarily
and consciously engaged in intercourse with the minor. As a result,
the legislature's delegation of the burden of proof to the defendant
as to a mistake of age did not violate the Alaska due process
clause 73
363. Steve, 875 P.2d at 119-20 (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 725 F.2d 832
(2d Cir. 1983)).
364. Id. at 120.
365. ALAsKA CONST. art. I, § 7.
366. 460 P.2d 77 (Alaska 1969).
367. 484 P.2d 677 (Alaska 1971).
368. 584 P.2d 25 (Alaska 1978).
369. Speide4 460 P.2d at 78.
370. Alex, 484 P.2d at 680-82.
371. Kimoktoak 584 P.2d at 29-30.
372. Steve, 875 P.2d at 123.
373. Id. at 123-24.
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Reutter v. State' presented the issue of the conformity of
Alaska Statutes section 12.45.046 with the Confrontation Clause of
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.375
Before Reutter's trial for the sexual abuse of his nine-year old
daughter ("A.R."), the prosecution moved that A.R. be permitted
to testify through one-way closed-circuit television, due to her
alleged inability to testify in the presence of her father.376 Reut-
ter objected, alleging that the statute on its face unconstitutionally
violated his Confrontation Clause rights. He also objected to the
testimony of the expert witnesses regarding whether A.R. would be
unable to testify in Reutter's presence.3' The trial court over-
ruled Reutter's objections and allowed A.R. to testify outside of
the presence of her father. Reutter was convicted, and he renewed
his objections on appeal.
Alaska Statutes section 12.45.046 allows a child under the age
of thirteen who is the victim of or a witness to a criminal offense
to testify via closed-circuit television only where a "case-specific
showing of actual necessity" is made.378 The statute requires the
trial court to consider several factors, such as the child's age,
development and health.379 It allows for the presence of both the
prosecutor and the defense attorney in the room with the child.38
The court first referred to Coy v. Iowa,311 in which the
United States Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause
includes the right to actual face-to-face confrontation between a
criminal defendant and the witnesses against him." However, in
Maryland v. Craig,3m the Court held that the defendant's right to
face-to-face confrontation was not absolute. It may be infringed to
374. 886 P.2d 1298 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
375. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him." CONsT. amend. VI. Reutter also
claimed a violation of the Alaska Constitution's confrontation clause and of due
process, both of which were rejected by the court in footnotes. Reutter, 886 P.2d
at 1308 n.8, 1311 n.12.
376. Id. at 1300.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 1303 & n.3; ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.046(a)(2) (1994).
379. ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.45.046(b)(1) - (b)(5) (1994).
380. Id. § 12.45.046(c).
381. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
382. Id. at 1021.
383. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
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protect vital state interests upon a "requisite finding of necessi-
ty."" The Craig Court held that Maryland's closed-circuit
testimony statute complied with the mandates of the Federal
Confrontation Clause due to the state's strong interest in ensuring
the protection of children from abuse."8
The Reutter court conceded that the Alaska statute did not
comply with all of the requirements of Craig, but it found that they
should be "deemed an implicit part of the statutory provision." '386
The court held that the statute is valid only where the trial court
makes the following determinations: (1) the child would be affected
by the presence of the defendant, rather than by the courtroom
atmosphere in general; (2) there is a risk of "serious emotional
harm" to the child from testifying in open court; and (3) the
procedure in the statute is therefore necessary for the child's well-
being."s Furthermore, the court held that the necessity of
resorting to the statute must be proven by the prosecution by clear
and convincing evidence, since "any risk of error in balancing the
individual right against the countervailing public interest must fall
on the side of protecting the innocent from an unjust convic-
tion.,388
B. General Criminal Law
1. Evidence. Mattox v. State389 addressed the issue of the
requirements that must be met in order for certain DNA evidence
to be admitted. The Alaska Supreme Court reversed the superior
court's grant of summary judgment against the defendant on the
basis of DNA tests. The DNA tests concluded that the likelihood
of the putative father's paternity was 99.99 percent.3 ° The court
held that the evidence had been improperly admitted due to the
lack of authentification as required by Alaska Rule of Evidence
901. It found a failure to provide sworn testimony asserting either
384. Id. at 855.
385. Id.
386. Reutter, 886 P.2d at 1306.
387. Id. at 1307.
388. Id. at 1308. The court relied on Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)
in its standard of proof analysis. Reutter, 886 P.2d at 1307.
389. 875 P.2d 763 (Alaska 1994).
390. Id. at 764.
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that the tests39' were sceintifically acceptable or that the proce-
dures necessary to validate the tests were followed."9
Miller v. State393 involved the admissibility of evidence in a
robbery prosecution of a defendant's previous involvement in drug
trafficking. The Alaska Court of Appeals held that the evidence
was admissible because it showed a common scheme or plan.394
Under Alaska Rule of Evidence 404(b), evidence of prior miscon-
duct is inadmissible if the evidence is used to prove the defendant's
character or propensity to engage in criminal activity. It is
admissible, however, for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge and identity.395 However,
the evidence may be admitted under Alaska Rule of Evidence 403
only if its probative value outweighs its potential for prejudice.396
In this case, the court of appeals found that the defendant's
drug debts and his plan to buy and resell cocaine in Florida led him
to participate in the robbery. Since the evidence was relevant to
prove motive and to prove the existence of a common scheme or
plan, the court concluded that it was admissible under Rule
404(b).3" Furthermore, the existence of motive and a common
scheme or plan were crucial elements of the prosecution's case in
that they were used to prove the identity of the defendant. As a
result, the court upheld the trial court's determination that the
evidence was admissible under Rule 403 because its probative value
outweighed its potential for prejudice. 9
In Reece v. State,3" Reece appealed his conviction of sexual
abuse of a minor in the first degree on the grounds that the trial
court erred in admitting lay opinion testimony concerning behavior-
al characteristics of child sexual abuse victims.' Alaska State
Trooper Michael J. Gomez interviewed L.E., the eight-year old
alleged victim, who reported at least five instances of sexual contact
with Reece. At trial, L.E.'s testimony differed in that she did not
391. ALAsicA STAT. §§ 25.20.050(d), (e) (1991).
392. Mattox, 875 P.2d at 764; ALASKA R. EvID. 901.
393. 866 P2d 130 (Alaska Ct, App. 1994).
394. 1& at 133.
395. Id, Alaska R. Evid. 404(b)(1).
396. Miller, 866 P.2d at 133; Alaska R. Evid. 403.
397. Id.
398. Id. at 134.
399. 881 P.2d 1135 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
400. Id. at 1136.
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remember five instances of sexual contact.4 ' Gomez was called
to the stand, and over Reeve's objection, was allowed to testify
concerning the theory of "minimization." This theory asserts that
child sexual abuse victims purportedly "minimize the extent of
what really took place whenever they're being interviewed ...
,"4 Gomez was also allowed to state his opinion that L.E.'s
behavior was consistent with what he had seen in other sexual
abuse victims.4'
In ruling that the testimony was improperly admitted, the
Alaska Court of Appeals relied on previous cases that held such
testimony may not be used to establish that an individual's
allegation of abuse is truthful because its characteristics are
"consistent" with typical cases of abuse. Although the trial
court had reached the same conclusion at the end of the trial, it
determined that the error in admitting the evidence was not
substantially prejudicial and therefore did not warrant a mistri-
al. 5 The court of appeals agreed and held that the admission of
the evidence was not reversible error.'
State v. Norman" was an appeal by the state from the
superior court's dismissal of an indictment against the defendant for
possession of marijuana.' Upon arresting Norman, the state
seized 140 marijuana plants and $3400 in cash. It turned over the
cash to the United States government, in the form of a cashier's
check, as proceeds from a drug sale.' Norman asked for the
bills' return, claiming their value as evidence. Upon being
informed by the state that any request for the money would have
to be addressed to the federal government, he moved to hold the
state in contempt for abusing its position as bailee of the mon-
ey.410 The trial court agreed and dismissed the case.4
The Alaska Court of Appeals held that the state's actions did
not deprive Norman of the chance to cast reasonable doubt on the
401. Id
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. Id at 1136-37.
405. Id.
406. Id. at 1138.
407. 875 P.2d 775 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
408. Id at 776.
409. Id
410. Id.
411. Id.
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state's case against him.412 Norman insisted that he earned the
money either by working as a painter or a fisherman. Consequent-
ly, the bills could exculpate him because they may have held fish
scales or paint flecks."1 3 The court dismissed Norman's argument
by noting that whatever the bills' properties, the reasonable doubt
they may have created would not aid in explaining the presence of
140 marijuana plants on his premises. 414  Thus, while the state
prejudiced Norman by dispersing the bills in commerce through the
purchase of the cashier's check, the remedy to be applied by the
trial court must be "limited to measures that redress Norman's loss.
S. .,4 The court reinstated the indictment and gave the trial
court two options: either suppress the existence of the bills or add
a jury instruction that the state destroyed the evidence.416
In Linton v. State,417 the Alaska Court of Appeals rejected
the defendant's challenge to the admission of hearsay evidence and
affirmed his murder conviction.4 8 Two months before he died,
Linton's father confessed to Pieroni, his domestic companion, that
he helped Linton load the body of Linton's dead wife into his van
seven years earlier.4 9 Pieroni reported this information to the
police after Linton's father's death and later testified at Linton's
trial.42°
On appeal, Linton argued that Pieroni's testimony did not fall
within Alaska Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) which provides for an
exception to the hearsay rule when a statement is made that "so
far tend[s] to subject the declarant to... criminal liability... that
a reasonable person.., would not have made the statement unless
believing it to be true.""42  Linton contended that his father's
statements should be doubted because the statute of limitations for
the crime for which his father was susceptible to prosecution had
expired. Moreover, since the statements were made to a compan-
ion unlikely to report them to the police, his father was not truly
412. Id at 777.
413. Id. at 776.
414. Id. at 777.
415. Id.
416. Id. at 777-78.
417. 880 P.2d 123 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994)
418. Id.
419. Id. at 125.
420. Id. at 125-26.
421. Id. at 127; ALASKA R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
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subject to prosecution.4' The court first noted that nothing in
the record indicated that Linton's father was aware of the statute
of limitations. Even if he was, a reasonable person would nonethe-
less be hesitant to admit to such conduct.4' As for Linton's
second argument, the court pointed out that while the intimacy of
a relationship may dampen one's fear of betrayal, there was no way
for Linton's father to be sure that Pieroni would not breach his
confidence.424 The court held that Linton's father's statements
were sufficiently reliable to qualify for the hearsay exception in
Alaska Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3).4'
In addition, the court ruled that the surrounding circumstances
of Linton's father's confession outweighed Linton's argument that
its admission violated his right to confrontation under the United
States and Alaska Constitutions.4' There was no evidence in the
record of anything but a close relationship between Linton and his
father. Linton's father's admission bore every indicia of a "sponta-
neous confession... prompted by [his] inability to cope with the
guilt he felt," rendering cross-examination unnecessary.427
In Nelson v. State,4' the defendant appealed his conviction
of first-degree murder, first-degree attempted murder and the
consecutive 99-year sentences he received for shooting eight times
into the car of his ex-girlfriend and her companion.429 The
Alaska Court of Appeals rejected Nelson's contention that the trial
court should not have ordered an independent psychiatric evalua-
tion because Nelson never formally notified the trial court of his
intention to rely on an insanity defense.43 The court ruled that
the trial court appropriately ordered the evaluation after it became
clear that Nelson was going to present a psychiatrist at trial.43'
As for Nelson's sentence, the court noted that the trial court
could properly find that Nelson's crimes deserved the maximum 99-
year sentence for each count.432 However, the court found the
422. Linton, 880 P.2d at 127.
423. Id.
424. Id. at 128.
425. Id.
426. Id. at 129-30.
427. Id. at 129.
428. 874 P.2d 298 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
429. Id. at 300.
430. Id. at 301.
431. Id. at 303.
432. Id. at 310.
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trial court's decision to run the sentences consecutively "trouble-
some" in light of the Mutschler rule.433 Under this rule, "[b]efore
a judge imposes consecutive sentences that exceed the maximum
sentence for the defendant's most serious crime, the judge must
find that ... that length is necessary to protect the public."' The
trial court did not explicitly make a Mutschler finding, which is not
necessary if the record "has unequivocally established that the
defendant posed an extreme danger of future misconduct and
lacked potential for rehabilitation."435  However, due to the
judge's remarks that he considered parole to be "an opportunity
for hope" for Nelson, the court remanded the sentence to the trial
court for appropriate findings under Mutschler.436
In State v. McDonald,437 the defendant appealed the trial
court's admission of numerous hearsay statements made by
witnesses. McDonald claimed that they were not only inadmissible
hearsay, but that their admission violated his constitutional right to
confrontation as well.438 Although the Alaska Court of Appeals
summarily dismissed most of McDonald's claims outright, it
conceded that testimony of a witness to whom McDonald's
codefendant had allegedly described his plan to hire a killer to kill
his wife, as well as the physical description of the killer, was not
admissible.439 The trial court had expressly told the jury not to
consider the witness's testimony, but McDonald urged the court of
appeals to adopt, "as a matter of state constitutional law," the logic
of the dissent in Richardson v. Marsh.'4 In Marsh, the United
States Supreme Court held that a curative jury instruction suffi-
ciently protected a defendant's confrontation rights when the
admission of a codefendant's out-of-court confession does not
"powerfully incriminat[e]" the defendant." The dissent argued
that whether a codefendant's confession is powerfully incriminating
should be resolved on a case-by-case basis. In the dissent's view,
433. Id.; see Mutschler v. State, 560 P.2d 377 (Alaska 1977).
434. Nelson, 874 P.2d at 310 (citing Mutschler, 560 P.2d at 380-81).
435. Id. at 311 (citing Neal v. State, 628 P.2d 19, 21 (Alaska 1981)).
436. Id. at 311-12.
437. 872 P.2d 627 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
438. Id at 642.
439. Id at 644. McDonald was not the hired killer described to this witness.
Id.
440. Id. at 646; Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987).
441. Marsh, 481 U.S. at 208.
[Vol. 12:1
YEAR IN REVIEW
some confessions could be damaging enough to warrant outright
exclusion from the jury's consideration. 2
The court refused to adopt either position as a matter of
Alaska constitutional law. It held that under either test, the
"incriminatory potential of [the testimony was] attenuated" with
respect to McDonald. 3 Any link between McDonald and the
codefendant that the jury could have constructed from the
statements would have had to have been drawn from a "second-
tier inference based on" the testimony of a third witness.'"
Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's admission of the
hearsay with a curative jury instruction over McDonald's confronta-
tion clause objection.! 5
2. Criminal Procedure. In Smith v. State,446 the defendant,
indicted for sexual assault and sexual abuse of a minor, made a
peremptory challenge pursuant to Alaska Criminal Rule 25(d)"7
to remove the judge before whom he first appeared. The judge
ruled the challenge to be premature because a judge had not yet
been formally assigned to the case. He proceeded to set bail,
schedule a pre-trial hearing and make discovery rulings." Smith
appealed the judge's delay of his challenge.
Under Alaska Criminal Rule 25(d), defendants are permitted
one change of judge without a showing of good cause, if made
within five days of formal assignment to a particular judge."9 In
Gieffels v. State,45 the Alaska Supreme Court held that the
peremptory challenge of a judge is not limited by the formal
assignment procedure, since defendants may be prejudiced by even
pre-trial rulings.45 Based on this clarification, the Alaska Court
of Appeals vacated the original judge's pre-trial orders and granted
Smith's original challenge.5
442. Id. at 214 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
443. McDonald, 872 P.2d at 647.
444. Id
445. Id.
446. 887 P.2d 979 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
447. ALASKA CRIM. R. 25(d).
448. Smith, 887 P.2d at 979.
449. ALASKA CRim. R. 25(d).
450. 552 P.2d 661 (Alaska 1976).
451. Id. at 669.
452. Smith, 887 P.2d at 981.
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In State v. Walker,453 the state appealed the trial court's grant
of a new trial to the defendant. The Alaska Court of Appeals first
analyzed whether the state's action was an appeal, "a demand that
an appellate court review a lower court's decision," or a petition for
review, a "procedural device which allows... the appellate court
to decline the case without reaching the merits." 4  The state
argued that the legislative amendment of Alaska Statutes section
22.07.020 allows the state to appeal any matter not "limited by the
prohibitions against double jeopardy" in the Federal and Alaska
Constitutions.45 Examining the legislative history of the statute,
the court concluded that while the legislature intended to broaden
the state's right of appeal in criminal cases,4 6 the expansion was
limited to the codification of State v. Michel. 7 The court noted
that the Michel rule granted the state the right to appeal final judg-
ments, excluding new trial orders. 48  Thus, the court character-
ized the state's action as a petition for review, which it granted
"because the issue raised is a significant one."459
Walker was arrested for stabbing Sutton once in the arm and
Dompeling three times in the back. ° Walker contended that his
actions were taken in self-defense. The jury convicted Walker of
stabbing Dompeling, but they acquitted him of stabbing Sutton.461
The trial court granted a new trial due to the inconsistency of the
verdicts. While the court of appeals conceded that a judge may
order a new trial under Alaska Criminal Rule 33 to avoid a
"failure of justice,"' it suggested an alternate basis under which
the jury could have reached its verdicts. A basic requirement of
the doctrine of self-defense is that the force used in defense may
not be disproportionate to the danger faced.463 Since Walker
stabbed Sutton once and Dompeling three times, the jury could
453. 887 P.2d 971 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
454. Id. at 971.
455. 1& at 973 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 22.07.020(d) (Supp. 1994)).
456. Id. at 976.
457. 634 P.2d 383 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981). The Michel rule was overruled by
the Alaska Supreme Court in Kott v. State, 678 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1984).
458. Walker, 887 P.2d at 976.
459. Id.
460. Id.
461. Id.
462. Id. at 977; ALAsKA CRIM. R. 33.
463. Walker, 887 P.2d at 978 (citing PAUL ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSE
(1984)).
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have reasonably found that his attack on Dompeling exceeded the
threat posed by the men, but that the attack on Sutton was well
within the limits of self-defense. Accordingly, the court re-
manded the trial court's order for reconsideration in light of that
possibility.46
3. Sentencing. In State v. Buza,4  the Alaska Court of
Appeals also found a sentence imposed for conviction of theft in
the first degree, a class B felony, to be too lenient. The accused,
Buza, was convicted of embezzling nearly $100,000 over four years
from the company of which he was president.467 Buza, a first-
time offender, received support both from his employer and his
community. He was held to have very good prospects for success-
ful rehabilitation.4
The superior court imposed a sentence consisting of four years
imprisonment suspended, a fine and community service. 46  In
disapproving that sentence, the court of appeals termed "all but
dispositive" its decision in the "functionally indistinguishable" case
of State v. Karnos.47° In Karnos, the appellate court held that the
actual service of no less than ninety days in jail constituted the
minimum term of incarceration acceptable for this type of of-
fense.47  The Buza court concluded that it did not find the
imposition of a modest amount of jail time contrary to the goal of
rehabilitating the offender.472 Judge Coats dissented, in large part
due to his belief that the imposition of five hundred hours of
community service adequately substituted for the lack of incarcera-
tion.473
In Borja v. State,474 the Alaska Court of Appeals held that
under Alaska Statutes section 12.55.145(a)(2),475 if a prior offense
464. Id.
465. Id. at 979.
466. 886 P.2d 1318 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
467. Id. at 1319-20.
468. Id. at 1320.
469. Id. at 1319.
470. Id. at 1320; State v. Kamos, 696 P.2d 685 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
471. Karnos, 696 P.2d at 687.
472. Buza, 886 P.2d at 1322.
473. Id. at 1323 (Coats, J. dissenting).
474. 886 P.2d 1311 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
475. Section 12.55.145(a)(2) states in part:
For purposes of considering prior convictions in imposing sentence under
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which constitutes a misdemeanor in the state in which it was
committed is sufficiently similar to a felony offense under Alaska
law, the offense may be considered a prior felony for presumptive
sentencing purposes.476 Borja had previously been convicted in
California for being an accessory to a robbery, a misdemeanor
under the law of that state.4' The superior court held that
Borja's California offense should be considered a prior felony for
presumptive sentencing purposes because it had elements sufficient-
ly similar to the Alaska felony offense of hindering prosecution in
the first degree.478
The Alaska Court of Appeals affirmed. The court noted that
the language of section 12.55.145(a)(2) allows any "offense"
committed in another state to be considered a felony under Alaska
law.479 The court also observed that, conversely, a felony in
another state may be considered a misdemeanor for sentencing
purposes under the law of Alaska.' Other jurisdictions general-
ly follow the rule that classification of an out-of-state prior offense
is governed by the treatment of that offense under the law of the
sentencing state.48x
Further, the court ruled that it would not be fatal to a
classification if conduct that is included in the definition of the out-
of-state offense is not included in the Alaska offense to which it
has been held to correspond. The court of appeals concluded that
the phrase "similar elements" used in sdction 12.55.145(a)(2)
implies that elements need not be identical.'
In Dodge v. Municipality of Anchorage,4 the Alaska Court
of Appeals considered three issues: (1) whether an amended
sentence for DWI that authorized placement in a residential
(2) a conviction in this or another jurisdiction of an
offense having elements similar to those of a felony
defined as such under Alaska law at the time the
offense was committed is considered a prior felony
conviction ....
ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.145(a)(2) (1990).
476. Borja, 886 P.2d at 1313.
477. Id. at 1312.
478. Id. at 1312; see ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.770 (1989).
479. Borja, 886 P.2d at 1313.
480. Id. (citing Mancini v. State, 841 P.2d 184 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992)).
481. Id. (citations omitted).
482. Id. at 1314.
483. 877 P.2d 270 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
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treatment facility violated double jeopardy; (2) whether the
sentencing court was required to consider ability to pay before
imposing a fine; and (3) whether lifetime revocation of a driver's
license constituted cruel and unusual punishment.'
Following his conviction for DWI, the trial court amended
Dodge's sentence, ordering him to complete an alcohol treatment
program. Such a program could include placement in a residential
treatment facility for up to ninety days in addition to jail time.'
The court of appeals agreed with Dodge's argument that confine-
ment in a residential treatment facility was essentially the same as
jail time. Therefore, the trial court's order violated his double
jeopardy rights.486
Dodge relied on Alaska Statutes section 12.55.035(a) to argue
that the court was required to take into account his ability to pay
before imposing a fine. However, the legislature amended
Alaska Statutes section 12.55.035 in 1992, deleting the part on
which defendant relied. Therefore, the court was under no
obligation to inquire into his ability to pay before imposing thefine.488
Finally, Dodge argued that the lifetime revocation of his
driver's license was so disproportionate and excessive as to
constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 9 The court rejected
this argument, citing the language of Alaska Statutes section 28.15-
.181(c) which authorizes revocation of a driver's license for any
period of years.49 The court also noted that the defendant had
a twenty-year history of DWI offenses, and that this offense was
particularly serious. It involved a blood-alcohol content of over
twice the legal limit and the endangerment of many people.
Therefore, the punishment was neither disproportionate nor
excessive.49'
In Haire v. State,49 the Alaska Court of Appeals considered
a twenty-five year sentence of two consecutive twelve and one-half
484. Id.
485. Id. at 271.
486. Id. at 272.
487. Id.; ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.035(a) (Supp. 1994).
488. Dodge, 887 P.2d at 272.
489. Id.
490. Id. at 272-73.
491. Id at 273.
492. 877 P.2d 1302 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
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year terms given to the defendant, who tiled no contest to two
counts of sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree.4  Haire, as
a first offender, faced a presumptive term of eight years. He
offered no mitigating factors to counter the four statutory aggravat-
ing factors which he conceded.494
Haire appealed the trial court's sentence as excessive when
compared with other first offenders of the same crime." The
court agreed that the trial court should have applied the sentencing
benchmarks to the entire sentence, rather than on a per count
basis.496 However, the court referred to "exceptional first offense
cases," where the benchmark does not fix an upper boundary to the
potential sentence.49  The court noted that the trial court made
a specific finding that his crimes were "exceptionally aggravat-
ed., 498 Thus, Haire could have properly received such a lengthy
sentence. Nonetheless, the court remanded Haire's sentence to be
reconsidered in light of the correct interpretation of the sentencing
benchmarks.49
In Roath v. State," the defendant was convicted of two
counts of criminal impersonation for impersonating a Playboy
Magazine photographer and persuading several women to pose for
nude photographs.50' Roath appealed his sentence of 600 days
with 300 suspended, a fine of $6000 with $2000 suspended and
twenty days of community service." The Alaska Court of
Appeals found ample support in the record for the sentence and
held that it was not clearly mistaken.5" However, the trial court,
in imposing his sentence, twice emphasized Roath's sentence
reduction for good behavior in prison." Roath argued that the
trial court's assumption that he would receive good time credits
may have resulted in an overly excessive sentence. He cited
493. Id. at 1303.
494. Id.
495. Id. at 1304 (citing State v. Andrews, 707 P.2d 900 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985)).
496. Id. at 1305. The applicable benchmark for Haire's sentence was ten to
fifteen years. Id.
497. Id. at 1306.
498. Id.
499. Id. at 1307.
500. 874 P.2d 312 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
501. Id at 313.
502. Id.
503. Id. at 314.
504. Id.
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Jackson v. State"5 in support of this contention.5°  In Jackson,
the Alaska Supreme Court found error where the sentence had
been imposed under the assumption that the defendant would
receive good time credit. The Roath court remanded the sentence
to the trial court with instructions to reconsider whether it was
influenced by Roath's prospects for good time credits in imposing
his current sentence.50 The Alaska Supreme Court later denied
Roath's petition for hearing in Roath v. State."8
In State v. McCallion,0 9 the Alaska Court of Appeals inter-
preted Alaska Statutes section 33.20.010510 and held that the
legislature intended to adopt a block computation method of good-
time credit for prisoners. Upon gaining statehood, Alaska
awarded good-time credit to inmates in blocks. The credit was
awarded according to a formula based on sentence length and
revoked upon prison rules violations."' This formula paralleled
the federal method in place prior to Alaska's statehood. In 1971,
the State Department of Corrections (DOC) adopted regulations
awarding credit under an accrual method, which awarded the credit
as good-time was served." 2 Mathematically, the accrual method
had the effect of reducing the actual number of good-time credits
awarded for identical sentences."3 In 1980, the legislature revised
the formula, leaving the DOC amendment in force from 1971 to
1980, the period challenged by the prisoners in this appeal.514
The court adopted a de novo standard of review, in line with
Tesoro Alaska Petroleum Co. v. Kenai Pipe Line Co.,51 since
good-time credit is essentially a legislative, rather than administra-
505. 616 P.2d 23 (Alaska 1980).
506. Roath, 874 P.2d at 314.
507. Id.
508. 879 P.2d 1008 (Alaska 1994); see also Justice Matthews' dissent. Id.
(Matthews, J., dissenting).
509. 875 P.2d 93 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
510. ALASKA STAT. § 33.20.010 (1986).
511. McCallion, 875 P.2d at 97.
512. Id.
513. Id at 95. For example, under the block computation method, a twelve-
month sentence would entitle the prisoner to a presumed sixty-day credit, at a rate
of five days per month. This would result in parole at the end of ten months of
good behavior. Under the accrual method, however, the time would accrue as the
months passed at the same rate, giving only fifty days good time credit at the end
of the same ten months. Id.
514. Id at 97.
515. 746 P.2d 896 (Alaska 1987).
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tive, matter. 16 The language of the 1960 statute was patterned
nearly identically after the federal model, and the legislative
records bear witness to such a legislative intent.5 Since the
DOC had no statutory or other authority to adopt an accrual
method in 1971, the court affirmed the trial court's award of good-
time credit to the prisoners under a block computation method 1 8
State v. Hernandez'1 9 was an appeal by the state challenging
the leniency of the defendant's sentence. 2 Hernandez ran a day
care clinic, where four children in her care received serious injuries
from blows to the skull and neck, bruises and infections, which
were not discovered until the parents had taken the children
home.5 2 Hernandez was convicted of one count of second-
degree assault, one count of third-degree assault and two counts of
fourth-degree assault, resulting in a composite sentence of a one-
year term, eight months of which could be converted to community
service and a suspended ten-year term.'z The Alaska Court of
Appeals reversed the sentence finding that it was too lenient to
meet the state's deterrence goals.
The court grounded its reversal in the survey of sentencing
ranges for all class B felonies reported in State v. Jackson.'
Based on Jackson, the court determined that Hernandez's sentence
was analogous to first offenders convicted of less serious assaults.
Accordingly, given the seriousness of the assaults,524 the status of
the victims and Hernandez's psychological evaluation,5' the court
concluded that her sentence did not "sufficiently address the
sentencing goal of general deterrence and is 'ill-suited to express
516. McCallion, 875 P.2d at 98.
517. Id. at 99 ("The principle of good time for prisoners should be adopted into
Alaska law as it is found in present federal laws dealing with Alaska.") (quoting
1960 House Journal 194).
518. Id.
519. 877 P.2d 1309 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
520. Id.
521. Id. at 1310-11.
522. Id. at 1311-13.
523. 776 P.2d 320 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).
524. In one, she broke the skull of a three-month old, placing him in critical
condition, and in another, she forcibly jammed a spoon down a six-month old's
throat. Hernandez, 877 P.2d at 1310-11.
525. A psychological evaluation characterized her as manipulative, in a constant
state of denial, and an unlikely prospect for rehabilitation. Id. at 1314.
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condemnation for the type of violent crime involved in this
case."' 5 A departure from the goals would be acceptable given
"sound reasons based in law,.., capable of being articulated," but
here the court found none in the record.5
In McGrew v. State,5' the Alaska Court of Appeals deter-
mined that defendant McGrew's use of a knife against a female
victim constituted the use of a dangerous instrument during the
robbery of the victim's husband so as to justify a presumptive
seven-year sentence under Alaska Statutes section 12.55.125(c)-
(2).529 McGrew pled no contest to the first-degree robbery of
Mr. Boschert, and the state in turn dropped McGrew's first-degree
robbery charge involving the taking of property from Mrs.
Boschert. 3° The trial judge sentenced McGrew to a presumptive
term of seven years because he held a knife to Mrs. Boschert
during the robbery. McGrew appealed the sentence on the grounds
that the statute, which provides a seven-year sentence if "the
defendant ... used a dangerous instrument ... during the
commission of the offense," should not apply to the robbery charge
involving the taking of property from Mr. Boschert 3'
The court of appeals noted that the Alaska robbery statute
53 2
defines robbery as the taking of property of another where "the
[defendant] uses or threatens... force upon any person with intent
to... prevent or overcome resistance... or compel any person to
deliver the property ... Thus, a person commits robbery
"whenever a defendant uses force on any person with the intent to
prevent or overcome anyone's resistance ... ."' The court held
that the trial judge appropriately found that McGrew's threat of
force against Mrs. Boschert nonetheless constituted the "use of a
dangerous instrument ... during the commission of the offense"
526. Id. at 1317.
527. Id. at 1316. Judge Coats dissented, and emphasized the "broad deference"
normally given trial courts in sentencing matters, especially for first offenders. Id.
at 1317-18 (Coats, J., dissenting).
528. 872 P.2d 625 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
529. Id. at 626; ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(c)(2) (Supp. 1994).
530. McGrew, 872 P.2d at 625.
531. Id. at 626 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(c)(2) (Supp. 1994)).
532. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.510 (1989).
533. McGrew, 872 P.2d at 626 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.510(a) (1989))
(emphasis in original).
534. Id. (emphasis in original).
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against Mr. Boschert within the meaning of Alaska Statutes section
12.55.125(c)(2), and it accordingly upheld McGrew's sentence5 35
In J.C. W v. State,536 the defendant, a minor, appealed a
disposition order in a delinquency proceeding which required him
to repay the value of items he and another juvenile had stolen and
damaged.537 J.C.W. argued that the trial judge erred by consider-
ing letters written by members of the victims' extended family, by
allowing the father of one of the victim's to attend the hearing, and
by holding J.C.W. jointly and severally liable for the entire amount
of damage, despite the fact that it exceeded his reasonable earning
capacity.538
The court of appeals noted that while Alaska Delinquency
Rule 22(a)(1) and Alaska Statutes section 47.10.081(a) specify what
materials "must be made available to aid the court in a disposition
hearing, neither purports to limit what materials the court may
consider as a discretionary matter. 5 39  Furthermore, the court
held that since Delinquency Rule 2(g) compares juvenile delinquen-
cy disposition hearings to sentencing hearings in criminal cases,
where sentencing judges have broad discretionary powers, the judge
may admit any "relevant and otherwise unobjectionable" evidence
in disposition hearings.5' Thus, the admission of the letters from
members of the victims family was within the discretion of the trial
judge.
As for J.C.W.'s second argument, the court conceded that the
victim's father did not qualify as an attendee of the hearing, since
he was neither the victim nor the victim's designee as required by
Alaska Statutes section 47.10.070(a). 41 However, under W.M.E
v. Johnstone,5' 2 the trial judge could have admitted him upon
undertaking a "careful case-by-case balancing of the respective
interests of the minor and the person who seeks admission." 43
If the trial judge found that the victim's father's interest was
"'substantial and ... the possibility of significant harm to the
535. Id. at 626-27.
536. 880 P.2d 1067 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
537. Id. at 1069.
538. Id. at 1070.
539. Id. (interpreting ALASKA DELINQ. R. 22(a)(1) and ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.-
081(a) (Supp. 1994)).
540. Id at 1071; ALASKA DELINQ. R. 2(g).
541. JC.W., 880 P.2d at 1071; ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.070(a) (Supp. 1994).
542. 711 P.2d 1187 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).
543. J.C.W., 880 P.2d at 1072.
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minor [wa]s negligible[,]"' she could have properly admitted him to
the hearing.5 " Since no such findings were made, the court
remanded the issue to the trial judge for an express W.M.E finding.
Finally, the court upheld the imposition of joint and several
liability for the total amount of damage, reasoning that if J.C.W.'s
accomplice paid his equal share of the damage, J.C.W. would be
responsible for an amount within his anticipated earning capaci-
ty."~ Similarly, the restitution order set out a reasonable pay-
ment schedule for J.C.W. However, his responsibility for the full
amount of damage gave the trial court leeway to later increase the
payments as J.C.W.'s earning capacity increased, offering the
victims the potential for complete reimbursement. 46
4. Miscellaneous. In Williams v. State,547 the Alaska Court
of Appeals held that a person who steers an automobile while it is
being towed comes within the prohibition of Alaska Statutes
section 28.35.030(a) on "driving"5' a "motor vehicle"549 while
intoxicated.5 The court observed that an intoxicated person in
control of an automobile that is moving on a road presents the
same degree of danger to other drivers regardless of the vehicle's
method of propulsion."' Next, the court concluded that a motor
vehicle which cannot be started remains within the statute's
purview.5 2 Finally, the court distinguished the facts from those
in Department of Public Safety v. Conley,553 on the ground that
Conley involved mere physical control over a vehicle rather than
the actual steering of a moving vehicle. 4
544. Id. at 1071 (quoting W.M.F., 711 P.2d at 1189-90).
545. Id. at 1072-73.
546. Id. at 1073.
547. 884 P.2d 167 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
548. "Driver" is defined as "a person who drives or is in actual physical
control of a vehicle." ALASKA STAT. § 28.40.100(a)(7) (1994).
549. "Motor vehicle" is defined as "a vehicle which is self-propelled except a
vehicle moved by human or animal power." ALASKA STAT. § 28.40.100(a)(12)
(1994).
550. Williams, 884 P.2d at 171.,
551. Id. at 169.
552. Id. at 169-70.
553. 754 P.2d 232 (Alaska 1988) (finding a requirement of operability of a
motor vehicle).
554. Williams, 884 P.2d at 170-71.
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The Alaska Court of Appeals dealt with a related issue in
Mezak v. State.5  In Mezak, the defendant appealed the magis-
trate's refusal to dismiss a charge of operating a watercraft while
intoxicated, contending that he had not actually been in operation
of the vessel when arrested. 6 The police arrested Mezak as he
was attempting to restart a boat that had stalled while he was
taking it out of the slough 5P Mezak argued that, in trying to
restart the boat, he was not actually trying "to operate" it, defined
as "to navigate or use" the vessel.558 The court compared the
definition to interpretations of the same phrase as applied to motor
vehicles, which merely require "'actual physical control"' of the
vehicle.559 The court saw "no reason not to apply a similar stan-
dard" to watercraft, and concluded that Mezak was both in use of
and in actual control of the boat.56
In Lipscomb v. State, 61 the Alaska Court of Appeals held
that certain 1988 legislation was ambiguous and insufficiently clear
to have given adequate due process notice that Lipscomb was on
probation when he failed to report to his probation officer in
1992. -62 In 1987, the legislature amended Alaska Statutes section
33.20.040(c)5" to provide for the concurrent running of mandato-
ry parole and probation time.56 In 1988, the legislature passed
effective date legislation which stated that the provisions of section
33.20.040(c) were to apply to prisoners incarcerated on or after
September 13, 1987.65
Defendant Ronald Lipscomb brought this appeal following the
superior court's revocation of his probation after his failure to
report to his new probation officer following his relocation from
Anchorage to Fairbanks 5 The basis of Lipscomb's appeal was
that the superior court could not revoke his probation under
555. 877 P.2d 1307 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
556. I
557. ML at 1307-08.
558. Id at 1308 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.030(m)(3) (1994)).
559. Id (citing State Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Conley, 754 P.2d 232, 234 (Alaska
1988)).
560. Id.
561. 869 P.2d 166 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
562. Id.
563. ALASKA STAT. § 33.20.040(c) (1986).
564. Lipscomb, 869 P.2d at 167.
565. Id at 168.
566. Id at 167.
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Alaska Statutes section 33.20.040(c) because he was not on
probation at the time of his violation. Lipscomb further claimed
that he did not have adequate notice that he was on probation 67
The court of appeals agreed with Lipscomb's contention that
the term "incarcerated" as used in the 1988 act was ambiguous in
that it could apply either to a period of incarceration or to the act
of incarceration. Therefore, the term "incarcerated" could apply
to those inmates in jail on or after September 13, 1987, or to those
inmates sentenced to prison on or after September 13, 1987' s
The court concluded that since the legislation was ambiguous on its
face, and since the legislative history failed to give Lipscomb
adequate due process notice that he was on probation, the court
could not have revoked Lipscomb's probation under Alaska
Statutes section 33.20.040.569 However, the court agreed with the
state that the most plausible interpretation of the statute was to
require concurrent probation and parole for all persons released
after its effective date, and therefore adopted this interpretation of
the statute prospectively from the date of the decision."7 '
The Alaska Court of Appeals, in Higgins v. Briggs,57' af-
firmed the superior court's dismissal of an inmate's petition for a
writ of habeas corpus.' Prison officials revoked a portion of the
appellant's good-time credit due to his violations of prison rules.
Appellant claimed that this was an excessive penalty for his minor
violations, and that if the credits were restored, he would be
entitled to immediate parole release 73 The superior court ruled
that the appellant's only relief would be through an administrative
appeal, in which he would be restricted to alleging violations of his
constitutional rights.574 The superior court judge then concluded
that his petition did not allege such violations, and she dismissed
the lawsuit.'
The court of appeals first pointed out that it did not have
statutory jurisdiction over appeals from a superior court's decision
567. Id.
568. Id. at 168.
569. Id at 168-69.
570. Id. at 169.
571. 876 P.2d 539 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
572. Id. at 544.
573. Id at 539-40.
574. Id at 540.
575. Id.
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in an administrative appeal. 76 The court of appeals then deter-
mined that an administrative appeal in superior court was Higgins'
sole method for seeking judicial review of his prison disciplinary
decision, and since the court lacked jurisdiction, affirmed the
superior court ruling.'
In E. T v. State,578 the Alaska Court of Appeals upheld the
trial court's order committing the minor defendant to the custody
of the Department of Health and Social Services as the result of
E.T.'s need for treatment of Fetal Alcohol Syndrome.5 9 The
Department wished to place E.T., a Nome resident, in a group
home in Fairbanks, and E.T. appealed on the basis that this was
not the "least restrictive alternative disposition" available.51 The
court accepted the trial judge's finding that E.T. could not obtain
adequate treatment in Nome, and held that it could review the
Department's placement decision only for abuse of discretion. 81
Thus, the Department's placement choice was upheld, since it
presented the only means of treatment for E.T.5"
In Trout v. State,583 the Alaska Court of Appeals affirmed a
conviction for consuming alcohol while under 21-years of age.51
At issue was a provision of Alaska's "minor consuming" statute
stating that it does not apply if the alcohol was furnished by a
parent or guardian.5  The defendant argued that this exception
is an element of the crime, which the prosecution must prove at
trial, and that since the prosecution failed to prove that the alcohol
consumed by the defendant was not furnished by his parent, his
conviction should be reversed.586  The court disagreed, finding
that this exception to the statute was a "defense" which must, at
least, be raised by the defendant."l However, since the defen-
dant offered no proof that his parents could have furnished the
alcohol, his appeal was rejected.
576. Id. at 540.
577. Id. at 543-44.
578. 879 P.2d 363 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
579. Id.
580. Id. at 365 (citing ALAsKA DELINQ. R. 23(d)).
581. ML at 366.
582. Id.
583. 866 P.2d 1323 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
584. Id.
585. ALASKA STAT. § 04.16.050 (1994).
586. Trout, 866 P.2d at 1324.
587. Id.
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In Mustafoski v. State,s88 the Alaska Court of Appeals
reversed the defendant's conviction for third-degree misconduct
because the trial judge had prosecuted Mustafoski on a separate
charge within two years of the trial.589 The relevant statute
provides for disqualification of the judge if he or she "has repre-
sented a person as attorney for the person against a party, except
the state[,] within two years preceding" the current case."g The
court interpreted the clause "except the state" to modify the word
"party," rather than the word "person," in the preceding
clause.59' Thus, the statute "prohibit[s] a judge from participating
in any case in which he or she, acting as an attorney for any
person, took legal action within the previous two years against any
of the parties to the current lawsuit except the State of Alaska...
2,592
Relying on Keel v. State,93 the state argued that the State of
Alaska should not be included within the definition of "person."
In Keel, the Alaska Supreme Court held that subsection (a)(5) of
the same statute, which disqualifies a judge when a party has
retained the judge as counsel within the past two years, did not
prevent judges who were formerly government attorneys from
trying lawsuits against the state.594 The supreme court reasoned
that a judge who was formerly a government lawyer did not
necessarily know of the matter at bar, and did not develop as close
of an attorney-client relationship as an attorney would with an
individual. 95
The Alaska Court of Appeals distinguished the result in Keel
from the current case. The court reasoned that an ex-government
prosecutor, sitting on the bench for a case involving a defendant
whom he had recently prosecuted, may retain personal knowledge
of extra-judicial data about that defendant which, despite any
intentional bias, may influence that judge's rulings. 96 In the same
vein, while a government attorney may not form a close bond to his
588. 867 P.2d 824 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
589. Md
590. ALASKA STAT. § 22.20.020(a)(6) (Supp. 1994).
591. Mustafoski, 867 P.2d at 832.
592. Md at 832-33.
593. 552 P.2d 155 (Alaska 1976).
594. Id. at 157 (interpreting ALAsKA STAT. § 22.20.020(a)(5) (Supp. 1994)).
595. Id.
596. Mustafoski, 867 P.2d at 835.
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or her client, he or she may hold "lingering animosity" against an
individual whom the attorney had recently prosecuted."9 Apply-
ing the logic of Keel, the court concluded that the word "person"
in Alaska Statutes section 22.20.020(a)(6) included the State of
Alaska, and that the defendant's motion to disqualify the trial
judge should have been granted5 9 8
In Linani v. State,599 the defendant, a Yugoslavian national,
entered into a no contest plea agreement in 1990 for a charge of
third-degree misconduct involving the sale of cocaine.' Limani's
counsel, after the court accepted the plea, asked the judge to
recommend that Limani not be deported as a result of his convic-
tion.". The judge so recommended, but in 1992, a federal
immigration judge ordered Limani's deportation because of his
conviction on narcotics charges. Limani then brought a motion to
withdraw his no contest plea, and appealed its denial to the Alaska
Court of Appeals. Limani argued that his plea was not entered
into voluntarily because the trial judge did not apprise him of the
likelihood that acceptance of the plea would cause his deporta-
tion.' Limani conceded that the Alaska Supreme Court had
already held in Tafoya v. State' that the possibility of deporta-
tion is a collateral result of conviction, of which the judge need not
inform the defendant. However, Limani contended that because
present federal immigration law mandates deportation of foreign
nationals upon conviction of a drug offense,' deportation is a
direct, rather than collateral consequence, of which the trial judge
should have informed him.'
The court of appeals rejected Limani's argument on three
grounds. First, the record established that Limani was aware of the
possibility of deportation, which demonstrated that his voluntary
acceptance of the plea was not affected by the absence of any
warning by the trial judge.' Second, the court noted that a
collateral consequence is "one originating outside of the trial
597. Id.
598. Id. at 835-36.
599. 880 P.2d 1065 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
600. Id.
601. Id. at 1066.
602. Id
603. 500 P.2d 247 (Alaska 1972).
604. 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp. 1992).
605. Limani, 880 P.2d at 1066.
606. Id. at 1066-67.
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court," irrespective of "whether the consequence is inevitable or a
mere possibility."6"7  Finally, the court cited federal case law
holding that the relevant federal statute does not mandate
deportation, but it gives the discretion to deport to the United
States Attorney General.' Thus, the court held that the trial
judge's failure to advise Limani of the consequences of deportation
did not give Limani grounds to withdraw his plea agreement.'
VI. EMPLOYMENT LAW
In 1994, the Alaska Supreme Court published several substan-
tial decisions in the field of employment law. In particular, the
court decided several difficult cases involving worker compensation
claims as well as a variety of other cases ranging from employee
benefits to the protection of volunteer employees under whistle-
blower legislation.
Underwater Construction, Inc v. Shirley610 involved the
interpretation of Alaska Statutes section 23.30.225(b), which allows
an employer to reduce workers' compensation payments to an
injured employee whose combined state and federal social security
disability benefits exceed eighty percent of the employee's
"average weekly wages." '' At issue was the meaning of the
phrase "average weekly wages." '612 The Alaska Workers' Com-
pensation Board determined that "average weekly wages" meant
the greater of "gross weekly earnings" or federal "average current
earnings," an interpretation that favors employees."3 The superi-
or court affirmed the Board's decision.
On appeal, Underwater Construction argued that "average
weekly wages" should be interpreted to mean only "gross weekly
earnings. ', 614 The Alaska Supreme Court found Alaska Statutes
607. 1& at 1067 (citing Fruchtman v. Kenton, 531 F.2d 946, 949 (9th Cir. 1976)).
The court also noted that federal courts continue to consider deportation a
collateral consequence despite the mandatory language of 8 U.S.C. § 1251. See,
e.g., United States v. Banda, 1 F.3d 354, 356 (5th Cir. 1993); Varela v. Kaiser, 976
F.2d 1357, 1358 (10th Cir. 1992).
608. Limani, 880 P.2d at 1067 (citing Downs-Morgan v. United States, 756 F.2d
1534, 1538 (11th Cir. 1985)).
609. Id.
610. 884 P.2d 150 (Alaska 1994).
611. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.225(b) (1990).
612. Underwater Constr., 884 P.2d at 151.
613. Id. at 152.
614. Id.
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section 23.30.225(b) to be ambiguous and therefore looked to
legislative intent in interpreting the statute.615  Before 1983,
"average weekly wages" was used to compute compensation. In
1983, the term "average weekly wages" was replaced by "gross
weekly earnings" in the statute. Under both statutes, compensation
was calculated based on historical earning capacity1 6. Therefore,
the court concluded that "average weekly wages" was synonymous
with "gross weekly earnings" in that both refer to historical earning
capacity, and that "average weekly wages" did not mean the higher
of "gross weekly earnings" or "average current earnings." 617
Accordingly, the judgment of the superior court was reversed.
The Alaska Supreme Court also decided a second case
involving Underwater Construction, Inc. and Mr. Shirley. In the
second case,618 Underwater Construction appealed the decision of
the Workers' Compensation Board awarding attorney's fees to the
claimant, contending that the award was inappropriate since it
never "controverted" the claim.1  Shirley, the injured worker,
cross-appealed the Board's denial of his request for an order
directing payment of permanent total disability ("PTD") bene-
fits. 620
Alaska Statutes section 23.30.145(a)621 provides that the
Board may direct payment of attorney's fees by an employer or
insurance carrier if it is found that a claim has been controvert-
ed.6' Underwater Construction argued that it never controverted
Shirley's claim, since its insurance carrier, Industrial Indemnity,
paid Shirley the same amount in temporary total disability
("TrD") benefits as Shirley would have been paid if he had been
granted PTD status.6' Shirley responded by arguing that his
status should have been changed from TID to PTD at the time his
physician indicated that his medical condition would not change
and he would not be able to return to gainful employment.624
The Alaska Supreme Court agreed with Shirley and held that
615. Id. at 153.
616. Id at 153-54.
617. Id at 156.
618. 884 P.2d 156 (Alaska 1994).
619. Id
620. Id
621. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.145(a) (1990).
622. Undenvater Constr., 884 P.2d 158 (Alaska 1994).
623. Id. at 158-59.
624. Id at 159.
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Industrial Indemnity controverted his claim by refusing to change
his status from TTD to PTD at the appropriate time.6' The
court also rejected the Board's argument that it lacked the
authority to order payment of PTD benefits.6'
McCarter v. Alaska National Insurance Company C'ANI")62'
involved an Alaska workers' compensation law that requires a
person who both receives workers' compensation benefits and
recovers damages from a third party to reimburse the employer or
the employer's insurance carrier for the benefits paid to the
employee.6' In this case, the superior court ordered the employ-
ee, McCarter, to reimburse ANI for the amount of compensation
he received for his injuries.629 McCarter appealed, claiming that
the purpose of Alaska Statutes section 23.30.015(g)" ° was to
prevent "double recoveries," a recovery in excess of the workers'
total losses."' Since McCarter did not receive compensation in
excess of his total losses, he claimed that section 23.30.015(g) did
not apply. The Alaska Supreme Court rejected this argument,
finding nothing in the text of the statute to support McCarter's
theory.63
2
McCarter further claimed that section 23.30.015(g), if read
correctly, was unconstitutional.633 He argued that not allowing
him to keep the proceeds from a third-party suit in effect denied
him access to the courts.' The Alaska Supreme Court rejected
this argument as well, reasoning that McCarter was entitled to keep
the proceeds from the third-party action after reimbursing the
employer's carrier for all benefits received and the employer's
litigation costs in the third-party litigation. 5
In Witmer v. Kellen, 6 the president of a corporation operat-
ing restaurant franchises brought a personal injury suit against a
franchise manager and the corporation for injuries sustained while
625. Id.
626. Id. at 160-61.
627. 883 P.2d 986 (Alaska 1994).
628. Id. at 988.
629. Id.
630. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.015(g) (1990).
631. McCarter, 883 P.2d at 989.
632. Id.
633. Id. at 990.
634. Id.
635. Id.
636. 884 P.2d 662 (Alaska 1994).
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he was riding in a vehicle driven by the manager of one of the
franchises. 7  The sole issue was whether Witmer's injuries
"arose out of and in the course of employment" under Alaska
Statutes section 23.30.265(2), s thereby invoking the exclusive
remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act.639 Witmer
argued that he accompanied Kellen on the trip to an assistant
manager's house as a personal break from work, and therefore was
not acting within the scope of his employment.' The Alaska
Supreme Court has held that if the activity is "reasonably foresee-
able and incidental" to the employment, it falls within the workers'
compensation law.'41  The court found that since Witmer had
accompanied Kellen on previous trips, his decision to accompany
him on this occasion was reasonably foreseeable. Furthermore,
since Witmer was the president of the company and would observe
Kellen's job performance on the trip, there was a sufficient relation
between Witmer's employment and his injuries." Therefore, his
injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment, and the
Worker's Compensation Act provided the exclusive remedy.63
In Andrews v. Alaska Operating Engineers - Employers
Training Trust Fund,' the Alaska Supreme Court addressed
federal preemption of state law claims arising from the termination
of the administrative manager of a trust subject to coverage under
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"). 645
In general, ERISA preempts all state claims that "relate to" any
employee benefit plan subject to ERISA. 6
After being fired from his position as administrative manager
of defendant's trust, 7 Andrews filed a complaint in superior
637. Id.
638. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.265(2) (Supp. 1994).
639. Witmer, 884 P.2d at 662-63.
640. Id. at 665.
641. Id. (citing Marsh v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 584 P.2d 1134,
1136 (Alaska 1978); Anchorage Roofing Co. v. Gonzales, 507 P.2d 501, 505
(Alaska 1973)).
642. Id. at 665-66.
643. Id. at 666-67.
644. 871 P.2d 1142 (Alaska 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 201 (1994).
645. Id. at 1143.
646. The provisions of ERISA "'supersede any and all state laws insofar as
they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan' subject to
ERISA. Id. at 1144 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988)).
647. Id. at 1143.
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court, alleging that he was terminated in order to prevent him from
exposing the misuse of trust funds." Andrews asserted that this
termination provided him with two state law causes of action:
violation of public policy and breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing.'49
The Alaska Supreme Court ruled that ERISA preempted both
of Andrews' claims and affirmed the lower court's dismissal for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction." ° The court noted that the United
States Supreme Court has concluded that state law claims relate to
ERISA if the state claim has "a connection or reference to
ERISA[,] 'even if the law is not specifically designed to affect such
plans, or the effect is only indirect.""'6 ' The court also observed
that every jurisdiction to consider cases involving retaliatory
discharge and "whistleblower" claims had determined that they
relate to ERISA.' s  Further, the court reasoned that the fact
ERISA provides a remedy for "whistleblower" claims suggests that
such claims fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
courts.'5 Finally, the court determined that because the "'un-
derlying theory"' supporting Andrews' good faith and fair dealing
claim implicated ERISA, it related to ERISA and, thus, was subject
to the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts.'
In Dwight v. Humana Hospital Alaska,'5 the Alaska Su-
preme Court clarified the circumstances in which a second
independent medical evaluation ("SIME") should be performed
pursuant to Alaska Statutes section 23.30.095(k). 6 Alaska
Statutes section 23.30.095(k) provides in relevant part: "In the
event of a medical dispute ... between the employee's attending
physician and the employer's independent medical evaluation, a
second independent medical evaluation shall be conducted by a
physician.., selected by the [Workers' Compensation] board...
648. Id.
649. Id.
650. Id. at 1149.
651. Id. at 1144 (quoting Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139
(1990)).
652. Id. at 1144-46.
653. Id. at 1145-46 (citations omitted).
654. Id. at 1149 (quoting Tingey v. Pixley-Richards West, Inc., 953 F.2d 1124,
1131 n.2 (9th Cir. 1992)).
655. 876 P.2d 1114 (Alaska 1994).
656. Id. at 1119.
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."' The court interpreted the statute to require the following:
(1) in every case, parties must be notified of their right to request
a SIME in the event of a medical dispute; (2) every request for a
SIME must be granted; and (3) where a medical dispute exists, the
Workers' Compensation Board may order a SIME sua sponte.68
The court held that failure to inform parties of these rights did not
constitute harmless error, and it accordingly remanded the case for
further proceedings consistent with its interpretation. 9
In Moesh v. Anchorage Sand & Gravel,' the Alaska Su-
preme Court reflected that an employee seeking reemployment
eligibility benefits"' must meet the eligibility requirements for such
benefits before the factor of remunerative employment662 will be
considered."n
Although Moesh's physical impairment prevented him from
resuming his job with the defendant, he could still perform other
types of work that he had done within the previous ten years. 6 4
Moesh argued that despite his ability to return to one of his
previous occupations, he should be eligible for reemployment
benefits because the wages that he would earn upon returning
would be less than sixty percent of the wages that he received at
the time of his injury.'
The court rejected Moesh's argument in light of the unambigu-
ous language of the statutes, despite the fact it might drastically
reduce his income.6s The court doubted that the legislature had
intended the pertinent statutes to have this effect; however, the
657. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.095(k) (1990).
658. Dwight, 876 P.2d at 1119-20.
659. Id. at 1120.
660. 877 P.2d 763 (Alaska 1994).
661. See ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.041(e) (1990 & Supp. 1994) (setting forth the
requirements for reemployment benefits eligibility, which include a physician's
opinion that the employee will be unable, due to permanent physical impairment,
to resume the work done at the time of the injury or any type of job the employee
has held during the previous ten years) (emphasis added).
662. See id. § 23.30.041(p)(7) (defining "remunerative employability" as
"having the skills that allow a worker to be compensated with wages or other
earnings equivalent to at least 60 percent of the worker's gross hourly wages at the
time of injury").
663. Moesh, 877 P.2d at 765.
664. Id. at 764.
665. Id.
666. Id. at 765.
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court concluded that it would be exceeding its authority if it
interpreted the statutes contrary to their unambiguous meaning. 7
In Schmidt v. Beeson Plumbing & Heating, Inc.,' the Alaska
Supreme Court held that an insurer's payments made pursuant to
Alaska Statutes section 23.30.155(d) did not represent a waiver by
that insurer of all defenses other than the assertion that another
entity is responsible for the benefits.669 The court noted that the
purpose of the statute was to ensure that the injured worker
received compensation while the issue of responsibility was
litigated, rather than to circumscribe an insurer's potential
defenses.6 70
Additionally, the court considered Schmidt's argument that a
Workers' Compensation Board member must personally attend the
hearing at which the evidence is presented to fulfill the statutory
due process requirements.67' Rejecting Schmidt's argument, the
court held that, as is the case with other types of administrative
hearings, a Board member can make an informed judgment by
reviewing the record of evidence received in his or her absence.672
Finally, the court ruled that the Board had violated Schmidt's
due process rights under the Alaska Constitution673 by refusing to
allow him to amend the witness list between the first hearing held
in April and its continuation in May.6 74 The court observed that
the Board had interpreted the rule requiring the final witness list
to be filed prior to the hearing67 in an unduly narrow manner
667. Id.
668. 869 P.2d 1170 (Alaska 1994).
669. Id. at 1176. Subsection (d) reads in relevant part:
When payment of temporary disability benefits is controverted solely on
the grounds that another employer or another insurer of the same
employer may be responsible for all or a portion of the benefits, the most
recent employer or insurer who is party to the claim and who may be
liable shall make the payments during the pendency of the dispute.
ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.155(d) (1990) (emphasis added).
670. Schmidt, 869 P.2d at 1176.
671. Id. at 1177. Alaska Statutes section 44.62.500(a)(2) states in relevant part:
"[A] member of the [Board] who has not heard the evidence may not vote on the
decision." ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.500(a)(2) (1993).
672. Schmidt, 869 P.2d at 1177-78 (citing Earth Resources Co. v. State Dep't of
Revenue, 665 P.2d 960, 962 n.1 (Alaska 1983)).
673. ALASKA CONST. art I, § 7.
674. Schmidt, 869 P.2d at 1179.
675. ALASKA ADmiN. CODE tit. 8, § 45.112 (Apr. 1991).
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that did not take into account the hearing's bifurcation. 76 The
court concluded that due to new developments which arose
between the two sessions of the hearing,6' the Board's failure to
allow Schmidt to amend his witness list constituted an abuse of
discretion.678
In Toney v. Fairbanks North Star Borough School District,679
the school district dismissed Toney, a public school teacher, upon
discovering that he had resigned from a prior teaching position in
Idaho after impregnating a fifteen-year-old student.' Although
Toney's actions were criminal under Idaho law (as well as under
Alaska law), he was not convicted of a crime due to an agreement
with the student's family. 81
Toney argued that Alaska Statutes section 14.20.170,' which
provides for the dismissal of a teacher on the grounds of "immoral-
ity," does not apply to conduct committed prior to the teacher's
employment in Alaska.' The Alaska Supreme Court rejected
Toney's argument in light of both the legislative history of the
statute and public policy, noting that his interpretation would
reward a teacher who successfully concealed past immoral conduct
during the job application process.6
McAdoo v. Diaz arose when Diaz, the church pastor,
removed McAdoo, a volunteer in the church, from her volunteer
positions involving close contact with Diaz.' McAdoo and Diaz
had argued over Diaz's decision not to install a handrail on a new
altar for the benefit of an elderly priest.' McAdoo, a physical
therapist, then reported Diaz's decision to the Department of
Family and Youth Services ("DFYS"), pursuant to the statutory
676. Schmidt, 869 P.2d at 1180.
677. Id. at 1179.
678. Id. at 1180.
679. 881 P.2d 1112 (Alaska 1994).
680. Id.
681. Id. at 1113.
682. Section 14.20.170 reads in relevant part: "A teacher... may be dismissed
at any time only for the following causes:... (2) immorality, which is defined as
the commission of an act, that under the laws of the state, constitutes a crime
involving moral turpitude. . .. " ALASKA STAT. § 14.20.170(a)(2) (1992).
683. Toney, 881 P.2d at 1114-15.
684. Id. at 1115.
685. 884 P.2d 1385 (Alaska 1994).
686. Id. at 1387.
687. Id. at 1386.
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duty under Alaska Statutes section 47.24.010(a)(1)6 to report
abuse of the elderly. Upon being removed from several volunteer
positions, McAdoo filed an action for damages regarding Diaz's
retaliatory conduct.689 The trial court granted the defendants'
motion for summary judgment, ruling that McAdoo was not a
member of the group of reporters protected by section 47.24.-
010(h).69
The Alaska Supreme Court held that Alaska Statutes section
47.24.010 does not protect "the intangible benefits of volunteer-
ing.,,691  Investigating the statute's legislative history, the court
determined that the legislature "limited the scope of the statute by
identifying and protecting certain relationships[,] '61 rather than
"protect[ing] the report[er] from any negative reaction by any
person on the basis of the report., 693 As such, the statute pro-
tects whistleblowers in employment relationships that provide
"substantial tangible benefits" but does not create a right to
"continued altruism."694 Thus, the court affirmed the trial court's
grant of summary judgment.695
In Moore v. State Department of Transportation and Publica-
tion Facilities,696 the state, in an effort to achieve cost savings
through privatization, eliminated the position held by Moore, a
state maintenance worker at an airport.' 97 Moore asserted that
the merit principle embodied in Article 12 of the Alaska Constitu-
tion698 prohibited the removal of state employees through privat-
ization.699
688. Section 47.24.010(a)(1) requires certain individuals, including physical
therapists, to report incidents of elder abuse or neglect. ALASKA STAT.
§ 47.24.010(a)(1) (1990). Section 47.24.010(h) ensures the protection of a reporter
from, among other things, discharge from employment, reductions in pay, loss of
housing or other benefits in retaliation for the report. Id. § 47.24.010(h).
689. McAdoo, 884 P.2d at 1385.
690. Id. at 1387-88.
691. Id. at 1390.
692. Id. at 1389.
693. Id. at 1390 (emphasis in original).
694. Id.
695. Id.
696. 875 P.2d 765 (Alaska 1994).
697. Id. at 766-67.
698. The Alaska Constitution requires the legislature to "establish a system
under which the merit principle will govern the employment of persons by the
State." ALASKA CONST. art. XHI, § 6.
699. Moore, 875 P.2d at 768.
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The Alaska Supreme Court observed that the merit principle's
purpose was to ensure that political affiliation and a "spoils
system" did not determine the allocation of state positions.700
However, the court noted that where the issue is the elimination of
jobs as opposed to the termination or hiring of individual workers,
the import of the merit principle is less clear."0
In ruling against Moore, the court determined that the merit
principle did not require the state to retain an unaffordable work
force and, thus, could not act as a "categorical bar" to privatiza-
tion.7'a The court recognized the gravity of the concern raised by
Moore, but found that the protection of the merit principle
contained in the State Personnel Act,703 as well as in rules adopt-
ed pursuant to it,704 coupled with the state's interests in efficiency
and economy, outweighed any potential danger that privatization
would be used as a means of political patronage.7 5
In dissent, Justice Rabinowitz, joined by Justice Compton,
contended that the majority did not adequately prevent privatiza-
tion from subverting the merit system.7 5 Finding the case-by-
case review procedure suggested by the majority wanting, Justice
Rabinowitz urged the legislature to enact "discrete standards
setting the preconditions for privatization. ' 71
The issue in Binder v. Fairbanks Historical Preservation
Foundation" was whether an employer was required to pay for
a second reemployment plan under Alaska Statutes section
23.30.041 when the first reemployment plan failed to meet the
expectations of the parties involved.7' The Alaska Workers'
Compensation Board awarded Binder a second reemployment plan
after he asserted that the first plan failed to provide him with the
skills necessary to compete in his chosen field.710 The superior
court reversed the Board's decision, holding that the second
reemployment plan violated the time and cost constraints of Alaska
700. Id. at 768-69.
701. Id. at 769.
702. Id. at 769, 771.
703. ALASKA STAT. §§ 39.25.010-.220 (Supp. 1987 & 1994).
704. See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 2, § 07.405(a) (Oct. 1994).
705. Moore, 875 P.2d at 772-73.
706. Id. at 773 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
707. Id. at 773-74 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
708. 880 P.2d 117 (Alaska 1994).
709. Id. at 118.
710. Id.
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Statutes section 23.30.041, which provides that reemployment plans
must not exceed a $10,000 cost limitation or a two-year time
limit.711
The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court and
agreed that the second plan would exceed the time and cost limits
of section 23.30.041.712 The court rejected Binder's argument that
the time and cost limits only begin to accrue upon completion of a
successful reemployment plan.713 The court found that the first
plan was valid, since it complied with the procedural requirements
of the statute and was agreed to by all parties.714 Thus, the court
looked to the express language and the legislative history of the
statute and concluded that any time or money spent on the first
plan must be counted toward the statutory maximums of Alaska
Statutes section 23.30.041. 71' Accordingly, the second plan would
exceed the statutory limitations, and Binder's employer was not
obligated to pay for it.
VII. FAMILY LAW
In 1994, the Alaska Supreme Court decided several major
cases in the area of family law. These cases have been subdivided
into three categories: custody and child support, property division,
and miscellaneous. Most notably, the supreme court dealt with
whether the State Department of Revenue may impose a monthly
child support obligation upon an indigent, incarcerated parent, and
whether records concerning treatment for alcoholism are privileged
in Child in Need of Aid proceedings.
A. Custody and Child Support
In Douglas v. State Department of Revenue,7 16 the Alaska
Supreme Court ruled that the State Department of Revenue
(DOR") may impose monthly child support obligation upon an
indigent, incarcerated parent. When the state provides public
assistance for minor children, Alaska Statutes section 25.27.120
deems the parents liable to the state for the full value of the
711. Id.
712. Id. at 123.
713. Id. at 121.
714. Id.
715. Id. at 122.
716. 880 P.2d 113 (Alaska 1994).
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assistance, unless a court order has set a lower amount.717 The
DOR, in enacting Civil Rule 90.3, has adopted a minimum support
level of $50 per month, to be paid to the state for public assistance
regardless of a parent's financial status or employability."'
Douglas conceded the rule's validity, but she contended that
it did not apply to situations such as hers, where a parent is
separated from his or her children involuntarily." She based her
argument on Clemans v. Collins,7' which relieved parents of a
duty to pay child support while incarcerated "'unless it is affirma-
tively shown that [they have] income or assets to make such pay-
ments.""'7 ' However, the court noted that the enactment of Civil
Rule 90.3 superseded Clemans, and it concluded that there was no
basis for distinguishing between incarcerated parents and other
destitute parents subject to the rule.7" Thus, despite Douglas'
inability to make the payments while incarcerated, the court
affirmed the trial court's order.7'
In State Department of Revenue v. A.H.,' the Alaska Su-
preme Court determined that Alaska Statutes section
25.27.040(a) 7' required the Alaska Child Support Enforcement
Division ("CSED") to pay for the paternity testing of a child
whose alleged father successfully rebuts the legal presumption of
paternity.2  Alaska law follows, through both statute 7 and
judicial decision, the "'longstanding common law rule''" that
the woman's husband is legally presumed to be the child's father.
717. Id. at 115 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 25.27.120(a) (Supp. 1994)).
718. Id (citing ALASKA R. Civ. P. 90.3).
719. Id.
720. 679 P.2d 1041 (Alaska 1984).
721. Douglas, 880 P.2d at 116 (quoting Clemans, 679 P.2d at 1041-42).
722. Id
723. Id at 117.
724. 880 P.2d 1048 (Alaska 1994).
725. Section 25.27.040(a) states in relevant part:
The [CSED] shall.., initiate efforts to have the paternity of children
born out of wedlock determined by the court. When the [CSED] is a
party in an action in which paternity is contested, it shall request and pay
for tests ... [and] may recover [costs] except that costs may not be
recovered from a person who is a recipient of aid under Alaska Statutes
sections 47.25.310 -47.25.420 (Aid to Families with Dependent Children).
ALASKA STAT. § 25.27.040(a) (1991).
726. A.H., 880 P.2d at 1049.
727. ALASKA STAT. § 18.50.160(d) (1994).
728. A.H., 880 P.2d at 1050 (quoting Smith v. Smith, 845 P.2d 1090, 1092
(Alaska 1993)).
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The presumption of a husband's paternity may only be overcome
by "clear and convincing" evidence.729
The CSED argued that because of this presumption of
paternity the child could not be considered "born out of wedlock"
and, thus, CSED would have no duty to pay for paternity testing
under Alaska Statutes section 25.27.040(a).73 The court, howev-
er, held that because both A.H. and her husband D.H. filed
affidavits stating that D.H. was not the father of the child in
question, they successfully rebutted the presumption,' and the
superior court properly ordered the CSED to pay for the paternity
testing.732
Karpuleon v. Karpuleon733 addressed the issue of whether "a
self-executing agreement for the future shifting of child support
payments, incorporated by reference into a decree of dissolution,
should be given legal effect despite the prohibition in Alaska Civil
Rule 90.3(h)(2)7' on retroactive modifications of child support
arrearages."'735 The parties' petition for dissolution stated that
one teenage child would live with the mother, and the other, also
a teenager, would live with the father.73 6
Before the dissolution was granted, the parties amended the
agreement so that both children would live with the father, and the
mother would not be required to pay child support.7 37 However,
the father agreed to pay child support if either child later began to
live with the mother.7 38 The trial court ordered that the amend-
ment be altered pursuant to Civil Rule 90.3 to require the mother
to pay child support to the father upon termination of the father's
spousal support payments.739 Unknown to the trial court, the
parties had executed a side agreement by which the father waived
729. Id.
730. Id.
731. Id.
732. Id at 1051.
733. 881 P.2d 318 (Alaska 1994).
734. Rule 90.3(h)(2) provides: "Child support arrearages may not be modified
retroactively. A modification which is effective on or after the date that a motion
for modification is served on the opposing party is not considered a retroactive
modification." ALASKA R. CIrv. P. 903(h)(2).
735. Karpuleon, 881 P.2d at 318.
736. Id.
737. IML
738. Id. at 319.
739. Id.
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any right to child support from the mother.7 The present action
arose when one child moved from the father's residence to the
mother's. 4'
The Alaska Supreme Court observed that disposition of the
case necessitated a determination of whether "the policy reasons
for giving effect to an agreement between divorcing spouses over
future shifting of child support obligations outweigh the policy
reasons behind prohibiting retroactive child support modifica-
tions."'742 The court upheld the parties' written agreement as
incorporated into the decree of dissolution, which provided that
Billy would pay child support to Deborah if either child began to
live with her.743 In upholding the agreement, the court empha-
sized that the agreement between the parties was in writing and
that the date of the child's change in residence was sufficiently
definite to preclude possible evidentiary difficulties.'
Carstens v. Carstens745 involved a child custody and property
division dispute arising from the 1991 divorce of Ann and Richard
Carstens. In February 1992, the trial court granted Richard
primary custody of the Carstens' daughter, Elizabeth, required Ann
to pay Richard $200 per month in child support and divided the
marital property equally.7'
On appeal, Ann argued that the trial court violated the
requirement of Alaska Statutes section 25.24.150(c)(7)747 by
refusing to consider evidence that Richard physically and emotion-
ally abused her.7' Ann also claimed that the court failed to
fulfill the requirements of Lowdermilk v. Lowdermilk,749 which
740. Id.
741. Id.
742. Id. at 320-21.
743. Id. at 321.
744. Id.
745. 867 P.2d 805 (Alaska 1994).
746. Id. at 807.
747. Section 25.24.150(c)(7) provides, in relevant part:
(c) The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best
interests of the child under [Alaska Statutes section] 25.20.060-.130. In
determining the best interests of the child the court shall consider...(7) any evidence of domestic violence, child abuse, or child neglect
in the proposed custodial household or a history of violence between the
parents ....
ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c)(7) (1991).
748. Carstens, 867 P.2d at 807.
749. 825 P.2d 874 (Alaska 1992).
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mandates detailed findings when spousal abuse is at issue."0 The
Alaska Supreme Court rejected both arguments, holding that the
trial judge fulfilled both requirements by specifically considering
evidence of spousal abuse and making factual findings on the issue
as to the best interests of Elizabeth."
Ann also claimed that the trial court abused its discretion by
not allowing the discovery of records pertaining to joint counseling
sessions previously attended by Ann and Richard.752 The trial
court deemed them irrelevant, but the Alaska Supreme Court held
that this determination amounted to an abuse of discretion, as the
records contained information concerning the parties' conduct
toward each other.753 The records were thus relevant in the
broad sense of relevance for discovery purposes under Alaska Civil
Rule 26(b)(1), and the court remanded the question to the trial
court to determine whether their exclusion mandated a new trial on
the custody issue.'
Next, Ann argued that the trial court abused its discretion in
considering interest income that Ann might earn in determining her
child support obligation.755 The Alaska Supreme Court agreed,
noting that the trial court did not use actual numbers in calculating
the child support award pursuant to the requirement set forth in
Terry v. Terry.756 The court reversed the child support award and
remanded it to the trial court for recalculation.757
B. Property Division
In Skvarch v. Skvarch,'5 8 the Alaska Supreme Court refused
to modify Richard Skvarch's obligation to pay his ex-wife Paulette
"temporary rehabilitative alimony" as they had agreed in their
original property settlement agreement.7" Richard argued that
because Paulette had completed her vocational training, found
employment and remarried, he should no longer be required to
750. Carstens, 867 P.2d at 808.
751. Id.
752. Id.
753. Id.
754. Id. at 809.
755. Id.
756. 851 P.2d 837, 838 (Alaska 1993).
757. Carstens, 867 P.2d at 809.
758. 876 P.2d 1110 (Alaska 1994).
759. Id. at 1111.
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make the monthly payments. ° The court distinguished support
payments that are "'integral part[s] of the property settlement'
from other support agreements. 6 The former provisions are
generally not modifiable, since they "constitute part of the
consideration given for other property benefits. 7 62
In the Skvarchs' case, the court concluded that the "temporary
rehabilitation alimony" was an essential part of the property
settlement agreement.76 The agreement credited the full amount
of the payments to Paulette's property award and debited Richard's
award by the payment amount as well.7' Furthermore, if the
payments were omitted from the award, the resulting property
division could be considered inequitable given the parties' respec-
tive earning capacities. 71 Finally, the court pointed out that
Richard was aware that Paulette's vocational training course was
expected to last only one year, leaving him no reasonable grounds
to claim that the payments should be cancelled because she had
completed her course.7 6
In Gallant v. Gallant,767 the Alaska Supreme Court ruled that
John Gallant's filing for bankruptcy after the trial court divided his
pension accounts, but before the court issued a Qualified Domestic
Relations Order ("QDRO") implementing the division, did not
destroy his ex-wife Shannon Gallant's interest in the accounts. 761
John argued that splitting the accounts would violate the automatic
bankruptcy stay imposed on his assets upon ffling.7 69 The court
rejected his argument, holding that "[a] spouse should not be able
to defeat or delay the effect of a property division order by filing
bankruptcy.""77  The preliminary division order transferred
Shannon's interest in the pensions to her immediately. Therefore,
her "portion of the pension was never part of John's bankruptcy
760. Id
761. Id. (quoting Keffer v. Keffer, 852 P.2d 394, 397 (Alaska 1993)).
762. Id. at 1112 (citing Keffer, 852 P.2d at 399 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting)).
763. Id
764. Id
765. Id.
766. Id. at 1113.
767. 882 P.2d 1252 (Alaska 1994).
768. Id at 1256.
769. Id.
770. Id.
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estate.""' The QDRO was simply a "formality," issued to meet
federal ERISA requirements, and the preliminary division order,
rather than the QDRO, had the legal effect of dividing John's
pension accounts.772
C. Miscellaneous
In re Adkins"7 presented two issues for review: whether the
probate court should have (1) disqualified an attorney for an
estate and (2) voided a Relinquishment Agreement on grounds of
fraud, misrepresentation and breach of the fiduciary duty of
disclosure.' 4 After Chet W. Adkins committed suicide in 1985,
his son Chet H. Adkins retained the services of attorney George
Goerig. When the probate court designated Adkins as the special
administrator of the estate, Adkins substituted a law firm for
Goerig as counsel to the estate. 5 In 1987, Adkins resigned as
personal representative of the estate, and his sisters became co-
personal representatives. Goerig was then substituted as counsel
to the estate, and Adkins petitioned to disqualify Goerig, alleging
a conflict of interest."6 The probate court dismissed the petition
upon approving the closure of the estate, finding that the best
interests of the estate required a swift resolution and that Goerig
would not harm or prejudice the estate.m
The Alaska Supreme Court concluded that Goerig's former
representation of Adkins would not injuriously affect Adkins in the
present matter."8 Therefore, the probate court did not abuse its
discretion in dismissing the disqualification petition.779 The court
also held that since Adkins had filed a petition to rescind and void
the Relinquishment Agreement but, later withdrew it, he could not
later appeal its validity.7'
771. Id. The court cited several theories applied by federal jurisdictions to
support this result, but it did not explicitly adopt any of them, preferring instead
to focus on the result of the preliminary division order. L
772. Id.
773. 874 P.2d 271 (Alaska 1994).
774. Id.
775. Id. at 271-72.
776. Id. at 272.
777. Id.
778. Id at 273.
779. Id.
780. Id at 274.
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The Alaska Supreme Court, in In re D.D.S.,78' held that
there is no evidentiary privilege for records regarding treatment for
alcoholism in Child in Need of Aid ("CINA") proceedings.'
Prior to trial on a petition to terminate the parental rights of
D.D.S.' parents, the Alaska Department of Health and Social
Services moved for the disclosure of the parents' alcohol treatment
records.71 The Department argued that federal law permitted
access to the records of federally funded treatment programs upon
a showing of good cause.' The trial judge refused the Depart-
ment's motion based on Alaska Statutes section 47.37.210, and the
Department filed for review with the Alaska Supreme Court.7"
The supreme court refused to permit use of the evidentiary
privilege in CINA proceedings due to the Department's compelling
interest in protecting the children of Alaska.7' The court re-
ferred to the Alaska statutes requiring doctors and teachers to
report suspected cases of child abuse or neglect, a requirement that
pierces the physician-patient and husband-wife privileges.7" In
addition, the CINA rules, which place an "affirmative duty... on
the court to determine the best interests of a child" support the
abrogation of the evidentiary privilege.7' Thus, the court re-
manded the case to the trial court with instructions to release the
records upon a showing of "good cause" as required by federal
regulations.8 9
In In re C.A.S.,790 the Alaska Supreme Court interpreted
Alaska Statutes section 47.10.092(a), added by a 1994 amendment
to the code.9  The case arose when B.S., the parent of two
minor children who had been placed in a foster home, began to
give the staffs of the governor and lieutenant governor confidential
781. 869 P.2d 160 (Alaska 1994).
782. Id at 161.
783. Id. at 162.
784. Id. The applicable statute was 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2(a), (b)(2)(C) (Supp.
1993).
785. D.D.S., 869 P.2d at 162.
786. Id. at 163.
787. Id. (citing ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.17.010-.060 (1990)).
788. Id.
789. Id, at 166.
790. 882 P.2d 1266 (Alaska 1994).
791. Id. at 1268 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.092(a) (Supp. 1994)).
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information regarding the alleged molestation of her daughter by
the child's foster father.792
The Division of Family and Youth Services had filed a Child
in Need of Aid ("CINA") petition for both minors. 79  The
child's guardian ad litem, appointed pursuant to the CINA petition,
filed a petition for a temporary restraining order, preliminary
injunction and injunction to prevent B.S. from discussing her
children's personal circumstances with the elected officials and their
staffs.
94
The lower court granted the petition and prohibited B.S. from
divulging the names of her children or any other information
learned from her children regarding their situation.795 In revers-
ing the lower court's decision, the Alaska Supreme Court held that
Alaska Statutes section 47.10.092(a) expressly permits "a parent in
a CINA proceeding [to] disclose confidential information to the
governor, the lieutenant governor, a legislator, and their staffs for
use in their official capacity.,
79 6
VIII. PROCEDURE
The Alaska Supreme Court handed down several important
rulings in the area of procedure in 1994. The issues covered areas
such as personal jurisdiction, public interest litigation and the right
to a jury trial in an employee dismissal review. Most notably, the
Alaska Supreme Court extended an exemption from personal
jurisdiction to a parent who was forced to litigate in an Alaska
court in Puhlman v. Turner.71' The court also held that the
plaintiffs in Hickel v. Southeast Conference798 were public interest
litigants entitled to recover their attorney's fees for their successful
challenge to the legislative redistricting plan. The cases in this
section are divided into three categories: Attorney's Fees, Statutes
of Limitation and Miscellaneous.
792. Id. at 1267.
793. Id.
794. Id. at 1268.
795. Id.
796. Id. (citing ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.092(a) (Supp. 1994)).
797. 874 P.2d 291 (Alaska 1994).
798. 868 P.2d 919 (Alaska 1994).
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A. Attorney's Fees
In Torrey v. Hamilton, the Alaska Supreme Court held
that attorney's fees incurred in an adversary proceeding in
bankruptcy are not recoverable as "costs of collection" for an
underlying judgment against the party filing for bankruptcy.'
The case arose when Hamilton filed a claim in superior court to
recover his attorney's fees resulting from an adversary action
against Torrey in bankruptcy court."o
The Alaska Supreme Court determined that an award of
attorney's fees to the prevailing party under Alaska Civil Rule
820 is limited to fees related to services of the attorney per-
formed in connection with the case in which the judgment is
entered.' Hamilton sought to recover for work performed after
judgment had been entered in superior court, but the supreme
court interpreted Civil Rule 82 to restrict the fee awards to services
performed prior to judgment." The court also rejected Hamil-
ton's argument that Civil Rule 79(b) authorized the recovery of
post-judgment attorney's fees, as that rule only applies to court
costs.' 5 As a result, Hamilton could not recover attorney's fees
incurred during the adversarial bankruptcy proceeding.
Hickel v. Southeast Conference° arose from a prior case in
which public interest litigants successfully challenged the legislative
redistricting plan promulgated by Governor Hickel.8" The
question in Hickel pertained to the award of attorney's fees under
Civil Rule 82 to the plaintiffs in the earlier litigation.
The Alaska Supreme Court first rejected Hickel's assertion
that fees should be awarded only for the particular issues on which
the plaintiffs prevailed.' The court reaffirmed the rule that fees
799. 872 P.2d 186 (Alaska 1994).
800. Id. at 187.
801. Id.
802. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 82.
803. Torrey, 872 P.2d at 187 (citing Alaska State Hous. Auth. v. Riley Pleas,
Inc., 586 P.2d 1244, 1249 (Alaska 1978)).
804. Id. at 187-88.
805. Id. at 188 (interpreting ALASKA R. Civ. P. 79(b)).
806. 868 P.2d 919 (Alaska 1994).
807. Hickel v. Southeast Conference, 846 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1992) (hereinafter
Hickel 1).
808. Hickel II, 868 P.2d at 924 (citing Gold Bondholders Protective Council v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 658 P.2d 776, 779 (Alaska 1983)).
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may be apportioned within the "broad discretion" of the trial
court.0 9 The court next ruled that plaintiffs were entitled to
attorney's fees for post-trial litigation, despite the fact that they did
not prevail in that phase.8 l0 The court based its decision on Civil
Rule 82, which allows the award of attorney's fees incurred up to
final judgment.81'
The court also declined to adopt an exception to Administra-
tive Rule 7(c) that would reimburse prevailing public interest
litigants for the costs of retaining non-testifying experts. 1 2 The
court reasoned that the breadth of Civil Rule 94, which gives
discretion to the trial court to obviate a rule of civil procedure in
the interest of justice, provides judges with sufficient flexibility to
prevent public interest litigants from being "chilled" by the cost of
experts who do not testify.
813
In S.L. v. JH.,1 4 the Alaska Supreme Court held that prior
to awarding attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Alaska Statutes
section 25.20.115,15 a trial court must make "explicit" findings of
fact concerning the financial circumstances of the parties and the
existence of bad faith conduct. 16 The case arose from S.L.'s
motion to modify a custody arrangement, which J.H. successfully
opposed.1  The trial court then granted J.H.'s subsequent
motion for full attorney's fees pursuant to section 25.20.115.18
The supreme court observed that the requirement to make
explicit findings is similar to the requirement imposed by the
809. Id. at 925-26 (citing Alaska State Bank v. General Ins. Co. of Am., 579
P.2d 1362 (Alaska 1978)).
810. Id. at 926.
811. Id.
812. Id. at 931.
813. Id.
814. 883 P.2d 984 (Alaska 1994).
815. Section 25.20.115 reads:
In an action to modify, vacate, or enforce that part of an order providing
for custody of a child or visitation with a child, the court may, upon
request of a party, award attorney fees and costs of the action. In
awarding attorney fees and costs under this section, the court shall
consider the relative financial resources of the parties and whether the
parties have acted in good faith.
ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.115 (1991) (emphasis added).
816. S.L., 883 P.2d at 985.
817. Id. at 984-85.
818. Id. at 985.
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court's interpretation of Alaska Statutes section 25.24.140(a)(1)." 9
However, the court noted that under section 25.20.115, "the
parties' relative financial resources do not necessarily take primacy
over the presence or absence of good faith."' 20 The court re-
manded the case and ordered the lower court to make the
necessary findings of fact regarding the parties' financial situation
and whether they had acted in good faith."2
The issue in Municipality of Anchorage v. Citizens for
Representative Governance' ("CFRG") was whether three
school board members who challenged petitions recalling them
from office were public interest litigants, thus allowing the trial
court to deny the Municipality's motion for attorney's fees.'
The Alaska Supreme Court recalled the four-part test laid out in
Anchorage Daily News v. Anchorage School District' to deter-
mine whether the school board members' action was a public
interest case:
(1) Is the case designed to effectuate strong public policies?
(2) If the plaintiff succeeds, will numerous people receive
benefits from the lawsuit?(3) Can only a private party have been expected to bring the
suit?
(4) Would the purported public interest litigant have sufficient
economic incentive to file suit even if the action involved only
narrow issues lacking general importance?
The court held that the strong public interest in fair elections
satisfied the first inquiry." The second requirement was also
met, as the suit exposed questionable election procedures and
would have benefited numerous people." As for the third
question, only the officials sought to be recalled could be expected
819. Id. (citing Kowalski v. Kowalski, 806 P.2d 1368, 1372-73 (Alaska 1991)).
Section 25.24.140(a)(1) reads in relevant part: "During the pendency of the action,
a spouse may, upon application and in appropriate circumstances, be awarded
expenses, including... attorney fees and costs .... ." ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.140-(a)(1) (1991).
820. S.L., 883 P.2d at 985-86.
821. Id. at 986.
822. 880 P.2d 1058 (Alaska 1994).
823. Id. at 1060.
824. 803 P.2d 402 (Alaska 1990).
825. Id at 404.
826. CFRG, 880 P.2d at 1062.
827. Id
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to file this suit.' Finally, the court observed that "none of the
plaintiffs had sufficient independent economic incentive to file
suit."' 9  Thus, the school board members were public interest
litigants, and the court affirmed the trial court's denial of the
Municipality's motion for attorney's fees.3°
B. Statutes of Limitation
Bauman v. Day"' involved fraud and breach of contract
claims pertaining to the purchase of land. Upon discovering
permafrost on land that they purchased from the Days, the
Baumans stopped payment on a promissory note that financed the
purchase, alleging fraud and breach of contract. According to the
Baumans, the Days had represented to them that the land was free
from permafrost and was a suitable site for building a home. 2
The Days then began foreclosure proceedings, which the superior
court set aside .33 The superior court also dismissed the Bau-
mans' fraud and contract complaints on the grounds that the statute
of limitations had run.'
The Alaska Supreme Court held that the superior court
properly set aside the foreclosure proceeding due to the alleged
defects in the underlying sales contract, reasoning that if the
contract were found to be invalid, the sale of the property was also
invalid. 5 The supreme court also affirmed the superior court's
ruling that the Baumans' fraud claims were barred by the statute
of limitations. 6 The court held that the statute of limitations
begins to run for tort claims when a reasonable person should have
known that he or she had a cause of action. 7 Thus, the Bau-
mans reasonably should have discovered the permafrost when they
stopped paying their property taxes, more than two years before
the claim was asserted.838
828. Id.
829. 1&
830. Id. at 1063.
831. 886 P.2d 608 (Alaska 1994).
832. Id. at 611.
833. Id. at 612.
834. Id. at 612-13.
835. Id. at 614.
836. Id. at 617.
837. Id. at 616. This rule was referred to as the "discovery rule" by the court.
I d.838. Id. at 617.
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However, the court found that the Baumans' contract claims
were not barred based on application of the "discovery rule." 9
Under the rule applied by the superior court, the statute of
limitations would have begun to run when the Baumans purchased
the property, and, therefore, would have barred their claims.
However, under the "discovery rule," the statute of limitations
began to run when the Baumans discovered the permafrost, four
years after they purchased the property." Thus, the Baumans'
contract claims were not barred by the statute of limitations, and
the superior court erred in dismissing them."
In Beesley v. Van Doren, 2 the issue on appeal was whether
the statute of limitations in a legal malpractice claim begins to run
before the final resolution of the litigation on which the claim is
based. 3  The court noted that Wettanen v. Cowper" estab-
lished that the statute of limitations applicable to legal malpractice
claims begins to run when the client discovers, or reasonably should
have discovered, the existence of actual damage resulting from the
alleged malpractice. 5 Furthermore, the statute of limitations will
begin to run regardless of whether the full extent of damage
incurred can be known at the time that the basis for the claim is
discovered."s
Beesley argued that because the amount of damage will not be
fully ascertainable prior to final judgment, the statute of limitations
should not begin to run until all appeals in the underlying litigation
have been exhausted, a rule followed by other jurisdictions.'
The court concluded that neither changed conditions nor a
balancing of the parties' interests warranted disturbing precedent
and refused to overrule Wettanen.w
The court also dismissed Beesley's contention that Wettanen
should not apply to his case because he continued to litigate the
839. Id. at 619.
840. Id
841. Id.
842. 873 P.2d 1280 (Alaska 1994).
843. Id.
844. 749 P.2d 362, 364 (Alaska 1988).
845. Beesley, 873 P.2d at 1281.
846. Id. at 1282 (citing Wettanen, 749 P.2d at 365).
847. See, e.g., Amfac Distribution Corp. v. Miller, 673 P.2d 792, 794 (Ariz.
1983).
848. Beesley, 873 P.2d at 1283.
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original claim after discovering malpractice. 9 Beesley asserted
that if the statute of limitations were to begin to run prior to the
final judgment, he would be forced to take contradictory positions
in the underlying litigation and the malpractice claim." The
court rejected this argument, noting that courts often adjudicate
inconsistent arguments or arguments structured in the alterna-
tiveY51
C. Miscellaneous
In Gallagher v. Gallagher,8 52 a successor judge amended the
findings of the original judge but later vacated her own amend-
mentsY3 Judge Elaine M. Andrews took over this divorce action
from Judge Jean M. Katz for administrative reasons." Thereaf-
ter, Judge Andrews granted Roslyn Gallagher's uncontested Motion
to Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, a motion that
altered the original division of property."5 A final judgment was
then entered based on the amended filingsY 6
Several months later, Judge Andrews, sua sponte, entered an
order vacating her previous orders and the judgment. 7 She
stated that they had been signed in error and that she had not
intended to change Judge Katz's findings. 8  The case was
subsequently referred to Judge Katz, who reinstated the initial
findings."9 Opposing their reinstatement, Ms. Gallagher asserted
that because the amended filings were uncontested and because
there was no appeal from Judge Andrew's final judgment, Judge
Andrew's orders and judgment could not be vacatedY °
The Alaska Supreme Court held that "[t]he fact [that] a
motion is uncontested does not mean that it must be granted as a
matter of right."86' Furthermore, the court noted that Civil Rule
849. Id. at 1282.
850. Id.
851. Id. at 1283.
852. 866 P.2d 123 (Alaska 1994).
853. Id.
854. Id.
855. Id. at 124 n.1.
856. Id. at 124.
857. Id.
858. Id.
859. Id.
860. Id.
861. Id.
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60(b) provided Judge Andrews with the authority to vacate her
orders and judgment sua sponte, an action which, under Civil Rules
63(c) and 40(d), did not amount to an abuse of discretion.862
Legge v. Greig63 concerned the rule that the voluntary
dismissal of an appellant's claim constitutes a waiver of the right to
appeal. 64 The case arose from Legge's claim that she had made
an effective acceptance of Greig's settlement offer.86 Greig then
refused to honor the alleged settlement offer, and Legge moved to
have the superior court confirm the settlement.6 The court
refused, and Legge attempted to file a conditional dismissal
retaining the right to appeal. 67 The trial court, however, refused
to accept the qualified dismissal and, instead, dismissed Legge's
claim with prejudice." s Legge then appealed the superior court's
order denying her motion to confirm the settlement, and Greig
opposed the appeal on the ground that the dismissal constituted a
waiver of Legge's right to appeal. 69
The AJaska Supreme Court observed that Legge held the
burden of establishing that her claim should be an exception to the
general rule that a voluntary dismissal amounts to a waiver of the
'right to appealY0  Legge attempted to satisfy this burden by
citing Cooksey v. State,s" where a criminal defendant was permit-
ted to plead no contest to an indictment without waiving the right
to appeal a pretrial ruling. However, the court considered Legge's
ability to control the litigation, as opposed to the defendant in
Cooksey's lack of control, and distinguished that case from
Legge. 2  Moreover, both the court and the prosecutor had
approved the conditional arrangement in Cooksey, whereas Legge
sought to preserve her appeal unilaterally 73 Therefore, the court
ruled against her.
862. Id (citing ALASKA R. Civ. P. 60(b)).
863. 880 P.2d 606 (Alaska 1994).
864. Id. at 607 (citations omitted).
865. Id.
866. Id.
867. Id.
868. Id.
869. Id.
870. Id. at 608.
871. 524 P.2d 1251 (Alaska 1974).
872. Legge, 880 P.2d at 609.
873. Id. at 608 (citing Cooksey, 524 P.2d at 1254-55).
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In dissent, Justice Matthews, joined by Justice Rabinowitz,
argued that Alaska should adopt the federal rule that a judgment
resulting from a voluntary dismissal may be appealed where the
dismissal was sought to achieve a more speedy review of a prior
order that disposed of claims the appellant wished to litigate
further. 4 Justice Matthews observed that the goals of efficiency
and economy favor the preservation of the right to appeal in such
cases, rather than requiring a full trial on all issues to preserve the
one issue which the appellant intends to pursue.'
The issue in Puhlman v. Turner876 was whether the superior
court had personal jurisdiction over a nonresident parent seeking
to enforce visitation rights awarded in an out-of-state judgment.
Puhlman, stationed in Germany, came to Alaska to enforce
visitation rights awarded to him by a divorce settlement in
Texas.8" Turner, Puhlman's ex-wife, cross-moved to increase his
child support payments, which Puhlman opposed on the ground
that the Alaska court had no personal jurisdiction over him.'
The superior court ruled that it had personal jurisdiction, and
Puhlman appealed its modification of his child support obliga-
tions. 9 Puhlman argued that it would be unfair for the superior
court to exercise personal jurisdiction over him since he was forced
to seek relief in the Alaska court or risk forfeiting his visitation
rights.80
The Alaska Supreme Court noted its usual reliance on Kulko
v. Superior Court," in which the United States Supreme Court
held that a court possesses personal jurisdiction over a defendant
otherwise outside of its personal jurisdiction only if the defendant
"purposefully avails" himself of the court." However, the
Alaska Supreme Court reasoned that considerations of fairness
should bar an Alaska court from exercising personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident parent whose connection with the state arose
from an attempt to enforce visitation rights awarded in an out-of-
874. Id. at 609 (Matthews, J., dissenting) (citing Empire Volkswagen, Inc. v.
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 814 F.2d 90, 94-95 (2d Cir. 1987)).
875. Id. (Matthews, J., dissenting).
876. 874 P.2d 291 (Alaska 1994).
877. Id. at 292.
878. Id.
879. Id. at 292-93.
880. Id. at 295.
881. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
882. Id. at 93-94.
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state judgment.' Furthermore, the court noted that policy
considerations of promoting visitation by non-custodial parents
would be undermined by subjecting parents who seek to enforce
visitation rights to the jurisdiction of Alaska.' Accordingly, the
court reversed the superior court's order and directed it to dismiss
Tumer's cross-motion.'
Pacific Marine Insurance Co. v. Harvest States Cooperative'
involved an asset purportedly owned by Pacific Marine Insurance
Company of Alaska ("PacAk"), which was in liquidation pursuant
to Alaska Statutes section 21.78.090(b).' PacAk's receiver
claimed that an annuity purchased by PacAk to fund a workers'
compensation claim was unlawfully transferred to an irrevocable
Oregon trust.' PacAk filed a motion to set aside and terminate
the trust, but Harvest States Cooperative contended that the
superior court lacked personal jurisdiction over the Oregon
beneficiary and the Washington trustee. 89  The superior court
agreed with Harvest States and declined to hear PacAk's mo-
tion."g PacAk then filed a second motion for an order to aid the
receiver, which the superior court also declined to hear on the
grounds that its findings for the first motion collaterally estopped
the court from hearing PacAk's second motion.91
The Alaska Supreme Court began its review by citing
Rappaport v. Tesoro Alaska Petroleum Co.,81 in which it estab-
lished a three-part test for collateral estoppel: (1) collateral
estoppel must be asserted against a party or one in privity with a
party to the first action; (2) the issue sought to be precluded must
be identical to that in the first action; and (3) the issue in the first
action must have been resolved by a final judgment on the
merits.8" The court held that the third requirement was not met
because the superior court's order did not have the character of a
883. Puhlman, 874 P.2d at 294.
884. Id. at 294-95.
885. Id. at 295.
886. 877 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1994).
887. Id. at 265.
888. Id
889. Id.
890. Id.
891. Id at 265-66.
892. 794 P.2d 949 (Alaska 1990).
893. Id. at 951.
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"final order" as required by Alaska Statute section 21.78.010-
(c)
8 94
The supreme court next turned to the merits of the superior
court's ruling that it lacked jurisdiction over parties indispensable
to the case under Civil Rule 19.895 The supreme court decided
that the superior court failed to apply the test set forth in Civil
Rule 19 to determine whether the parties in question were, in fact,
indispensable and, therefore, the superior court had committed an
abuse of discretion.
The Alaska Supreme Court then proceeded to undergo the
"three-part analysis" necessary to make a finding of indispensabili-
ty.896  First, the parties must be "necessary" under Civil Rule
19(a)."9 If so, the trial judge must determine whether the parties
can be joined, taking into account requirements of personal
jurisdiction. 98 Third, if "the parties are necessary and cannot be
joined," the court must determine whether they are "indispens-
able" under Civil Rule 19(b).89
The court began its analysis by holding that if the beneficiary's
interest will not be impaired by the trustee's absence, then neither
of the parties are necessary.' In general, the interests of a
beneficiary cannot be protected in the absence of both the
beneficiary and the trustee."0  However, this case neither in-
volved an attempt to modify the terms of the trust nor an attempt
to invalidate it.' In addition, the court observed that the facts
of this case warranted a departure from the general rule, and it
considered the beneficiary's interests adequately protected by
Harvest States, the co-settlor of the trust. 3 Therefore, neither
the trustee nor the beneficiary were necessary parties, and, thus,
they were not indispensable parties.' The supreme court
894. Pacific. Marine Ins. Co., 877 P.2d at 268; ALAsKA STAT. § 21.78.010(c)
(1990).
895. Pacific Marine Ins. Co., 877 P.2d at 268 (citing ALASKA R. Civ. P. 19).
896. Id.
897. Id.
898. Id. at 268-69.
899. Id. at 269.
900. Id.
901. Id.
902. Id.
903. 1&
904. Id. at 270.
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reversed the superior court's order and remanded to hear PacAk's
motion to aid the receiver. 5
In Fairbanks North Star Borough School District v. Dun-
can,9' the Alaska Supreme Court held that school teachers have
no right to a jury trial in a dismissal review under Alaska Statutes
section 14.20.205.1 A jury trial is provided under the Alaska
Constitution only "'to the same extent as it existed at common
law.""'9°s However, statutorily based claims do not confer the
right to a jury trial "unless the statute so provides or the statutory
remedy is a codification of a common law remedy." Alaska
Statutes section 14.20.205 merely allows a teacher a trial de novo
on appeal from the school board decision, and at common law,
there was no action available to teachers in Alaska for wrongful
dismissal.91 Thus, the Alaska Supreme Court held that the trial
judge should have denied Duncan's motion for a jury trial.
The appeal in Devincenzi v. Wright9 arose when the trial
court denied the motion of Devincenzi's counsel to withdraw from
the case.912  Under Alaska Civil Rule 81(d)(1)(iii), an attorney
may be permitted to withdraw as counsel "[w]here the party
expressly consents in open court or in writing to the withdrawal of
his attorney and the party has provided in writing or on the record
a current service address and telephone number."9 3 The Alaska
Supreme Court determined that the pleading filed by Devincenzi's
attorney pursuant to his motion for withdrawal as counsel fully
complied with the requirements of Rule 81(d)(1)(iii). 4 The trial
court, without further explanation, stated that its sole reason for
denying the motion to withdraw was that it was not "properly
presented."9 5 As a result, the supreme court held that the trial
court abused its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw as
counsel.9 6
905. Id.
906. 878 P.2d 641 (Alaska 1994) (per curiam).
907. ALASKA STAT. § 14.20.205 (1994).
908. Duncan, 878 P.2d at 641 (quoting ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 16).
909. Id. (citing Diedrich v. City of Ketchikan, 805 P.2d 362,367 (Alaska 1991)).
910. Id.
911. 882 P.2d 1263 (Alaska 1994).
912. Id. at 1263-64.
913. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 81(d)(1)(iii).
914. Devincenzi, 882 P.2d at 1265.
915. Id.
916. Id.
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IX. PROPERTY LAW
The Alaska Supreme Court decided a variety of issues
concerning property law in 1994. The cases dealt with issues
ranging from takings of property to the liability of landlords for
injuries sustained on their property.
In Cannone v. Noey,917 a landowner brought an action
against the Department of Environmental Conservation ("DEC"),
claiming that the DEC's improper denial of his development plan
constituted a per se regulatory taking.918 The trial court held that
a temporary taking had occurred because the regulation had
"denied Noey all economically feasible use of his property. '919
On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court found no evidence to
support the trial court's conclusion that Noey was prevented from
selling the property or further dividing it for a use other than he
originally proposed to the DEC 20 Therefore, the DEC's denial
of Noey's development plan did not satisfy the "extraordinary
circumstance[s]" necessary to deny Noey all economically feasible
uses of his land.21 The supreme court accordingly held that no
taking occurred and reversed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment.2
In Newton v. Magill,' the Alaska Supreme Court over-
turned the common law rule that a landlord generally is not liable
for dangerous conditions in leased premises.2 The court held
that a landlord remains liable for dangerous conditions on leased
premises as a result of the legislature's enactment of the Uniform
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act ("URLTA") as embodied in
Alaska Statutes sections 34.03.010-380.2
917. 867 P.2d 797 (Alaska 1994).
918. Id. at 799. The Alaska Supreme Court, in Noey v. Dep't of Environmental
Conservation, 737 P.2d 796 (Alaska 1987), reversed the DEC's original denial,
giving Noey the grounds for the claim underlying the instant appeal. Cannone, 867
P.2d at 799.
919. Id. at 801.
920. Id.
921. Id
922. Id. at 801-02.
923. 872 P.2d 1213 (Alaska 1994).
924. Id. at 1214. The principal case in Alaska that set forth the common law
rule of landlord immunity is City of Fairbanks v. Schaible, 375 P.2d 201 (Alaska
1962). Newton, 872 P.2d at 1216.
925. Id. at 1214 (citing ALAsKA STAT. §§ 34.03.010-.380 (1990)).
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The instant case involved a tenant's negligence suit against her
landlord to recover for injuries that she suffered from falling on the
slippery wooden walkway leading from the door of her resi-
dence.' The superior court dismissed the tenant's claim, finding
that as the exclusive user of the walkway, she was responsible for
its condition.'
The supreme court grounded its decision on an analysis of the
duties imposed by the URLTA on tenants and landlords regarding
the upkeep of leased premises. Tenants are required by the statute
to "keep that part of the premises occupied and used by the tenant
as clean and safe as the condition of the premises permit[s]."'
The court reasoned that this obligation of the tenant extended only
to such activities as "ice and snow removal, and other light mainte-
nance." 9  On the other hand, landlords have a statutory duty to
"'make all repairs and do whatever is necessary to put and keep
the premises in a fit and habitable condition." ' 93  The court
interpreted this language to impose an obligation on the landlord
to maintain all inherent physical aspects of the property.93' Thus,
the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the superior court's dismissal.
In conclusion, the court emphasized that it did not intend its
holding to obviate the trial court's duty to inquire into issues such
as the reasonableness of a party's conduct, foreseeability, the
magnitude of risk, and whether the dangerous condition existed in
an area under the exclusive control of the tenant.932
Roeckl v. ED..C.33 addressed the permissibility of a convey-
ance of real property to a grantee under an assumed business
name. The case arose when land, shortly to become subject to a
lien by the F-DIC due to a judgment for failure to pay a promissory
note, was transferred to the "Fermell Company," owned by
Roeckl.' The Fermell Company was registered neither under
the laws of Alaska nor those of its asserted corporate situs, the
Federal Republic of Germany, and the FDIC argued that the
926. Id.
927. Id.
928. ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.120(1) (1990).
929. Newton, 872 P.2d at 1214.
930. Id. (quoting ALAsKA STAT. § 34.03.100(a)(1) (1990)).
931. Id.
932. Id. at 1218.
933. 885 P.2d 1067 (Alaska 1994).
934. Id
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transaction was a sham intended to avoid the imposition of a
lien.935 The Alaska Supreme Court observed that the common
law recognizes conveyances to a grantee under a fictitious, trade or
assumed name.936 In contrast, a conveyance to an entirely non-
existent entity is void at common law.937 While the Fermell
Company was not a registered corporation at the time of the
transfer, the court held that it "'does not affect the validity of a
conveyance that the name of the grantee... is one.., assumed by
him for the occasion .... "',93 8
The court also held that an assumed business name need not
be registered in order to be recognized for the purpose of taking
title to property.39  Nowhere in the Alaska Statutes does a
registration requirement appear, and furthermore, the "plain
wording" of Alaska Statutes section 10.35.01040 indicates that the
legislature intended to make the registration of a business name
optional.94'
At issue in Swanson v. Krenik942 was the legal relationship
between an original mortgagor and a first grantee when a second
grantee defaults. 943 The first grantee, Swanson, argued that when
she conveyed the property in question to the second grantee, she
and the original mortgagors, the Kreniks, became co-sureties.9"
Therefore, Swanson contended that she was entitled to contribution
from the Kreniks for a share of the deficiency judgment resulting
from the default. 45 The Alaska Supreme Court disagreed and
held that the Kreniks became a subsurety to Swanson upon
Swanson's conveyance of the property to the second grantee. Thus,
935. Id. at 1069-70.
936. Id. at 1071-72 (citations omitted).
937. Id. (citations omitted).
938. Id. at 1072 (quoting 4 HERBERT T. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY § 967, at 42 (3d ed. 1975)).
939. Id. at 1074.
940. Section 10.35.010 states: "The exclusive right to the use of a business
name may be reserved by a person intending to start a business or a person
intending to change the name of the person's business." ALASKA STAT.
§ 10.35.010 (1989).
941. Roeckl, 885 P.2d at 1074.
942. 868 P.2d 297 (Alaska 1994).
943. Id.
944. Id.
945. Id.
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the Kreniks were not liable to Swanson for the second grantee's
default.9"
X. TORT LAW
The Alaska Supreme Court addressed a number of questions
dealing with tort law in 1994. In particular, the court ruled on
whether the state may be liable for the sexual abuse of minors in
day care facilities that it has approved pursuant to its licensing
procedure. The court established absolute immunity for court
appointed custody investigators and psychologists, and held that
where a health care provider negligently misplaces important
medical records in a medical malpractice case, the trial court may
shift the burden of proof as to the legal cause of the plaintiff's
injuries to the provider.
R.E. v. State947 arose from the physical and sexual abuse of
R.E.'s children by the owners of a day care facility operating under
license from the Division of Family and Youth Services ("DFYS").
The Alaska Supreme Court held that, as a result of its establish-
ment of a licensing process for such facilities, the state has a duty
of due care "to take reasonable steps to prevent harm" to children
in state-licensed day care facilities." The court observed that the
vulnerability of children accounts for the foreseeability of abuse in
day care,949 which in turn outweighs any "deep pocket" conse-
quences inherent in recognizing the state's additional exposure to
liability.950
The state argued that Alaska Statutes section 09.50.250
immunizes it from liability, as the state was not required to
implement a licensing scheme. 1  The court held that although
immunity exists with regard to the state's decision to perform a
discretionary function,952 the state is not immune if it fails to
946. Id. at 301.
947. 878 P.2d 1341 (Alaska 1994).
948. Id. at 1347.
949. Id. at 1346-47.
950. Id. at 1347.
951. Section 09.50.250 reads in relevant part: "[A]n action may not be brought
... based upon the [state's] exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function or duty... whether or not the discretion involved
is abused." ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.250(1) (1994).
952. R.E., 878 P.2d at 1348 (citations omitted).
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exercise due care in carrying out such a function once undertak-
en.
953
In Lythgoe v. Guinn,' the Alaska Supreme Court estab-
lished the right of absolute quasi-judicial immunity for court-
appointed psychologists and custody investigators. Quasi-judicial
immunity provides absolute immunity to persons other than judges
who perform functions "'intimately related to the judicial pro-
cess"' 955 requiring "discretionary judgment.""95  The instant
action involved a suit against a court-appointed independent
custody investigator, Dr. Guinn, alleging that she had carried out
her custody investigation in a negligent manner and had imper-
missibly acted as an advocate for one of the parties.957
The court first observed that nearly all jurisdictions recognize
quasi-judicial immunity for judicial officers charged with functions
analogous to those performed by Dr. Guinn.958 Public policy
considerations, such as ensuring that court-appointed professionals
have the "freedom to act in an objective and independent man-
ner"959 and removing threats of retaliatory claims by unsatisfied
litigants, weigh strongly in favor of granting quasi-judicial immuni-
ty.960 The court also noted that appellate review and cross-
examination of the court-appointed official provide effective
alternative remedies to litigation.961
The court also rejected Lythgoe's argument that immunity can
be waived where the court-appointed official assumes the role of
advocate for a party, as some courts have held to be the case for
a guardian ad litem.962 The court reasoned that the acceptance of
such an argument would "open the door to allegations of waiver
by advocacy in every case where the quasi-judicial officer makes a
recommendation contrary to a party's position."'963
953. Id.
954. 884 P.2d 1085 (Alaska 1994).
955. Id. at 1087 (quoting S.T.J. v. P.M., 556 So.2d 244 (La. Ct. App. 1990)).
956. Id. at 1089.
957. Id. at 1086.
958. Id. at 1087.
959. Id. at 1089.
960. Id. at 1090.
961. Id. at 1091.
962. Id. at 1091-92 (citations omitted).
963. Id. at 1092.
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Benner v. Wichman964 arose from electrical shock injuries
sustained by Wichman through contact with the bucket of a crane
that Benner was operating in violation of statutory guidelines 65
The Alaska Supreme Court held that Benner was a subcontractor
of Wichman, rather than his co-employee, and thus, not immune
from tort liability.9" The court observed that Benner did not
meet the definition of "employee" as set forth by the "relative
nature of the work test."967 The court also found that the trial
judge had erred in instructing the jury that Wichman's actions did
not constitute negligence as a matter of law.96
Finally, the court considered whether the Tort Reform Ballot
Initiative required Benner's percentage of fault to be reduced by
the percentage of fault attributable to non-parties to the action.969
Because Alaska Statutes section 09.17.080(a) restricts the term
"party" to include only "part[ies] to an action, including third
party defendants and settling parties,"' the court held that a
defendant's liability under the statutory scheme in question could
not be reduced by allowing the jury to allocate fault to a non-
party.9
71
Jensen v. Goresen 72 arose from a collision between two
fishing vessels. Goresen's boat had opened its seine net, when
Jensen's boat, skippered by Lindholm, lowered its skiff and let its
seine inside Goresen's open seine.' In so doing, Lindholm
struck Goresen's vessel and caused him to sustain personal injuries.
Lindholm also caught the herring that Goresen was attempting to
snare. 4  Goresen brought an action against both Jensen and
Lindholm for personal injuries, damage to his vessel, and conver-
964. 874 P.2d 949 (Alaska 1994).
965. Id. at 954.
966. Id. at 952.
967. IM. at 952-53 (citations omitted).
968. Id. at 955.
969. Id. The initiative amended Alaska Statutes section 09.17.080(d) to require
that judgment be entered "against each party liable on the basis of several liability
in accordance with that party's percentage of fault." ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.080(d)
(1994). The initiative also eliminated the right to contribution among tortfeasors
by repealing Alaska Statutes section 09.16.010. Benner, 874 P.2d at 955.
970. Id. at 958.
971. Id.
972. 881 P.2d 1119 (Alaska 1994).
973. Id. at 1120-21.
974. Id. at 1121.
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sion of the herring.75 Following a jury verdict in favor of Gore-
sen and the trial judge's order establishing a constructive trust out
of Jensen's profits from the herring, Jensen and Lindholm ap-
pealed.76
The Alaska Supreme Court first held that evidence of
Lindholm's prior conviction for conspiracy to poach fish was
properly admitted for impeachment purpose under Alaska Rule of
Evidence 609.' Rule 609 allows, for impeachment purposes, the
admission of prior convictions for crimes involving dishonesty,
including "all crimes that 'disclosefl the kind of dishonesty which
would bear upon a person's tendency to testify truthfully.""'
The court ruled that a conspiracy to poach fish was properly
considered a crime involving dishonesty, and it upheld the trial
judge's admission of Lindholm's prior conviction.?9
Next, the court held that although Goresen had yet to close his
seine, he still had a "'certain possessory interest' in the fish that
he would have captured had he not been thwarted by the colli-
sion.9 0 The court noted that "fishermen in Alaska have a
custom of never entering another vessel's circled net," a custom
which bestows a possessory interest in any fish within a boat's open
net.98' The court also ruled that an appropriate amount of the
award was properly deposited in a constructive trust from which
crew members could recover their share."m
Sweet v. Sisters of Providence in Washington9' involved a
medical malpractice suit against a hospital and health care
providers brought by the parents of a child who suffered brain
damage as a result of treatment for an infection.9' Before trial,
the defendants were unable to locate a variety of records compiled
975. Id.
976. Id.
977. Id.; ALAsKA R. EviD. 609.
978. Jensen, 881 P.2d at 1122 (quoting City of Fairbanks v. Johnson, 723 P.2d
79 (Alaska 1986)).
979. Id. The court observed that the crimes held to involve dishonesty include
concealment of merchandise, larceny and embezzlement, and robbery. Id.
980. Id. at 1123 (quoting McKibben v. Mohawk Oil Co., Ltd., 667 P.2d 1223,
1228 (Alaska 1983)).
981. Id. at 1122-23.
982. Id. at 1124 (relying on Miller Indus. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 733 F.2d
813 (11th Cir. 1984)).
983. 881 P.2d 304 (Alaska 1994).
984. Id. at 306-07.
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during the child's hospital stay, including his nursing narration
notes and medication sheets.9" Due to the defendants' failure to
preserve the medical records adequately, the trial judge shifted the
burden of proof on the questions of duty and breach.9" The jury
nonetheless returned a verdict for the defendants, and the Sweets
appealed, arguing primarily that the trial court should have also
shifted the burden of proof on the issue of causation.'17
The Alaska Supreme Court began its analysis by recognizing
that "a number of courts in other jurisdictions have created a
rebuttable presumption shifting the burden of persuasion to a
health care provider who negligently alters or loses medical records
relevant to a malpractice claim."9  Specifically, the court
approved of the result and reasoning in Public Health Trust v.
Valcin,989 in which the Florida Supreme Court outlined three
characteristics of the shifted burden. First, the trial court must
ascertain the significance of the missing records to the plaintiff's
ability to pursue a negligence claim before the court is authorized
to shift the burden.9" Second, the records must have disappeared
"through the negligence or fault of the adverse party."' In the
instant case, the supreme court held that the trial court erred by
excluding the negligence per se doctrine, which the Sweets had
offered as a means to prove the defendants' negligence in losing
the records.9" Third, the burden shifting must not create a
"'vanishing presumption,"' which would disappear upon the
defendants' introduction of evidence in rebuttal.9" Rather, the
presumption "'is not overcome until the trier of fact believes that
985. Id. at 307.
986. Id. at 310.
987. Id.
988. Id.
989. 507 So.2d 596 (Fla. 1987).
990. Sweet, 881 P.2d at 3il. The Sweet court did not adopt a standard by which
the plaintiff must prove the importance of the records, but it did support this result
with language from Patrick v. Sedwick, 391 P.2d 453 (Alaska 1964), a case also
relied upon by the Valcin court. Sweet, 881 P.2d at 311.
991. Id. (citing Valcin, 507 So.2d at 599).
992. Id. at 312. The court held that the defendants should be allowed to prove
that its loss of the records was excused, however. Id. (citing Ferrel v. Baxter, 484
P.2d 250 (Alaska 1971)).
993. Id. (quoting Valcin, 507 So.2d at 600-01).
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the presumed fact has been' proven by the appropriate standard
under the substantive law.994
Under the reasoning of Valcin, the Sweet court held that the
trial judge should have applied a rebuttable presumption in favor
of the Sweets as to the legal cause of their child's injuries. 5
Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded the case for a new
trial where, unless the defendants were able to prove that they
were excused from preserving the records, the trial court would be
required to place the burden on the defendants "to affirmatively
disprove medical negligence and causation." 6
In Navistar International Transportation Corp. v. Pleasant,9'
Pleasant brought a personal injury suit against the truck's manufac-
turer, Navistar, the truck's seller, Alaska Truck Center, and the
brake's manufacturer, Indian Head Industries, Inc. for injuries he
sustained while cleaning a dump truck brake.98 He settled his
claims with Alaska Truck Center and Indian Head, and a jury
awarded him over $3 million in his suit against Navistar.9 '9
Navistar appealed, claiming that the court erred by (1) not reducing
the verdict by Indian Head's 45 percent share of the fault, (2) not
accounting for Pleasant's $2.1 million settlement with Alaska Truck
Center, and (3) awarding prejudgment interest at a rate of 15.5
percent.'O° Pleasant cross-appealed, claiming that the trial court
erred in refusing to award prejudgment interest on future damag-
es.1
0ol
Regarding Navistar's first argument, the supreme court looked
to the terms of the settlement agreement between Pleasant and
Indian Head, which relieved Navistar from all liability caused by
Indian Head's negligence or fault." Finding this language
dispositive, the court reduced the adjusted verdict against Navistar
by Indian Head's percentage of fault, 45 percent.'m3 The court
agreed with Navistar's second argument as well, citing former
Alaska Statutes section 09.17.090, in force at the time of the
994. Id. (quoting Valcin, 507 So.2d at 600-01).
995. Id.
996. Id. at 313.
997. 887 P.2d 951 (Alaska 1994).
998. d. at 953.
999. Id
1000. Id. at 954.
1001. Id.
1002. Id. at 957.
1003. Id.
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damage award, which mandated "reduction of a claim against other
joint tortfeasors 'to the extent of any amount stipulated by the
release . ... ."'I' Thus, the settlement between Pleasant and
Alaska Truck Center was credited to Navistar's liability, bringing
it below zero."°5
The court next turned to Pleasant's cross-appeal, as it would
bring Navistar's damages above zero again if successful. The
supreme court noted that the trial court had refused to add
prejudgment interest to future damages, but it had reduced the
damages to present value at the time of trial rather than at the time
of injury." °  The supreme court affirmed, noting that to allow
prejudgment interest on future damages discounted at the point of
trial would be to give Pleasant "double recovery" for his inju-
ries.' 007
Laura E. Fahey
Steven D. Moore
James P Ursomarso
1004. Id. at 957-58 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.090 (repealed 1987)).
1005. Id. at 958.
1006. Id. at 959.
1007. Id.
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